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THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF NONPOINT NUTRIENT
POLLUTION: COULD THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT OFFER SOME RELIEF?
ZDRAVKA TZANKOVA*

ABSTRACT
Nutrient pollution of rivers, streams, lakes, and estuaries is one
of the preeminent water quality issues in the United States today, and
poses a significant threat to the health of aquatic ecosystems. Agricultural nonpoint discharges, the runoff of nitrogen and phosphorous from
animal manure and chemical fertilizers, are the primary sources of such
nutrient pollution.
A pervasive and long-standing problem, nonpoint pollution, nutrient and otherwise, has proven to be one of the toughest challenges in
contemporary environmental regulation. This situation is significantly
attributable to the political and administrative dynamics of fragmented
regulatory authority. The power to control such nonpoint discharges remains largely beyond the reach of federal Clean Water Act authority, and
rests with the states, who have proven to be reluctant regulators.
This Article proposes a new, conceptually different approach to
changing the regulatory status quo and tackling the problem of nonpoint
nutrient pollution. It draws a roadmap for a strategic leveraging of the
Endangered Species Act, particularly Section 9, against individual nonpoint dischargers and/or their state regulators. It starts with the widespread ecological damage from nonpoint nutrient pollution and looks for
a regulatory silver lining to the harmful effects that such nutrient pollution is having on threatened and endangered species of aquatic wildlife.
The core objective is to show how the strong protections ESA provides for
listed wildlife can be leveraged to better protect the broader nutrientafflicted aquatic ecosystems of which listed species are but one part.
INTRODUCTION
Nutrient pollution of rivers, streams, lakes, and estuaries is one
of the preeminent water quality issues in the United States today, and
*
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a significant threat to the health of aquatic ecosystems.1 Agricultural
nonpoint discharges, the runoff of nitrogen and phosphorous from animal manure and chemical fertilizers, are the primary sources of such
nutrient pollution.2
The Gulf of Mexico dead zone,3 hypoxia-caused damages to the
Chesapeake’s rich and complex ecosystem,4 and nutrient-driven alterations of unique plant communities in Florida’s remarkable “river of
grass”5 are some of the more dramatic and familiar consequences of
aquatic nutrient pollution. The profound ecological effects of nutrient
enrichment, including many nutrient-driven changes in ecosystem structure and function, are experienced across the nation’s watersheds.6

1

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA NEEDS TO ACCELERATE
ADOPTION OF NUMERIC NUTRIENT WATER QUALITY STANDARDS 1 (2009) [hereinafter EPA
OIG]; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WADEABLE STREAMS ASSESSMENT: A COLLABORATIVE SURVEY
OF THE NATION’S STREAMS ES-6 (2006) [hereinafter EPA 2006], available at http://www.epa
.gov/owow/streamsurvey/pdf/WSA_Assessment_May2007.pdf; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY CENTER, CULTIVATING CLEAN WATER: STATE-BASED REGULATION OF AGRICULTURAL
RUNOFF POLLUTION 1 (2010) [hereinafter ELPC], available at http://elpc.org/wp-content
/uploads/2010/05/ELPC-Cultivating-Clean-Water-updated-May-5-2010.pdf; NATIONAL QUALITY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE QUALITY OF OUR NATION’S
WATERS: NUTRIENTS IN THE NATION’S STREAMS AND GROUNDWATER 1992–2004 1 (2010)
[hereinafter USGS], available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1350/pdf/circ1350.pdf.
2
ELPC, supra note 1, at 1–3.
3
Nancy N. Rabalais et al., Gulf of Mexico Hypoxia, a.k.a. “The Dead Zone,” 33 ANN. REV.
OF ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 235, 236 (2002); Walter K. Dodds, Nutrients and the “Dead
Zone”: The Link Between Nutrient Ratios and Dissolved Oxygen in the Northern Gulf of
Mexico, 4 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & THE ENV’T 211 (2006); see also NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, IMPROVING WATER QUALITY IN THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER BASIN AND NORTHERN
GULF OF MEXICO: STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 11 (2010).
4
See, e.g., Donald F. Boesch et al., Chesapeake Bay Eutrophication: Scientific Understanding, Ecosystem Restoration, and Challenges for Historical Trends and Ecological
Interactions, 30 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 303, 305–07 (2001); W.M. Kemp et al., Eutrophication
of Chesapeake Bay: Historical Trends and Ecological Interactions, 303 MARINE ECOLOGY
PROGRESS SERIES 1, 4–6 (2005); see generally NAT’L ACADEMIES PRESS, ACHIEVING NUTRIENT
AND SEDIMENT REDUCTION GOALS IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY: AN EVALUATION OF PROGRAM
STRATEGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION 1–29 (2011).
5
See, e.g., Connie Chiang et al., Effects of 4 Years of Nitrogen and Phosphorus Additions
on Everglades Plant Communities, 68 AQUATIC BOTANY 61, 62–63 (2000); Gregory B. Noe
et al., Phosphorus Biogeochemistry and the Impact of Phosphorus Enrichment: Why Is the
Everglades so Unique?, 4 ECOSYSTEMS 603, 609, 618–19 (2001); Curtis J. Richardson et
al., Estimating Ecological Thresholds for Phosphorus in the Everglades, 41 ENVTL. SCI.
& TECH. 8084 (2007); see also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., EVERGLADE SNAIL KITE:
MULTI-SPECIES RECOVERY PLAN FOR SOUTH FLORIDA 4-294, 4-295 (1999), available at
http://www.fws.gov/verobeach/MSRPPDFs/EvergladeSnailKite.pdf.
6
See infra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, imperiled aquatic wildlife is also at the receiving end of nutrient enrichment and its various repercussions. Altered
nutrient inputs are currently a threat to an estimated twenty-five percent
of imperiled freshwater fauna.7 Nutrient-driven anoxia and hypoxia are,
for example, increasing juvenile mortality and interfering with the reproduction of southeastern populations of the endangered shortnose
sturgeon.8 Nutrient-triggered expansion of invasive plants in Florida’s
Everglades impairs the foraging of the endangered Everglade snail kite.9
Additionally, surviving populations of several unique, highly imperiled
federally listed species of southeastern freshwater snails are significantly
threatened by nonpoint nutrient pollution.10 In the aggregate, nonpoint
nutrient discharges from agriculture, along with agricultural alteration
of sediment loads, constitute one of the three leading threats to imperiled
freshwater fauna in the United States.11
Current aquatic nutrient pollution in the United States is largely
the result of regulatory failure. The most critical is the notable failure of
the broader U.S. water pollution control regime to regulate discharges
from nonpoint sources (“NPS”), especially agriculture, into surface and
subsurface waters. The vast majority of nonpoint discharges remain
outside of the regulatory reach of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and
beyond the reach of its most effective and most successful pollution control program, the binding and enforceable National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”) program for control and permitting of
point source discharges.12
Under the current scheme of cooperative environmental federalism, direct control over NPS discharges belongs to the states. Many
states, in the face of strong resistance from the politically influential
7

B. Richter et al., Threats to Imperiled Freshwater Fauna, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
1081, 1086 (1997).
8
See Jed G. Campbell & Larry E. Goodman, Acute Sensitivity of Juvenile Shortnose
Sturgeon to Low Dissolved Oxygen Concentrations, 133 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. FISHERIES SOC’Y 772, 775 (2004); M.R. Collins et al., Primary Factors Affecting Sturgeon
Populations in the Southeastern United States: Fishing Mortality and Degradation of
Essential Habitats, 66 BULL. MARINE SCI. 917, 918 (2000); D.H. SECOR & E.J. NIKLITSCHEK,
HYPOXIA AND STURGEONS: REPORT TO THE CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM DISSOLVED OXYGEN
CRITERIA TEAM 3–5, 9 (2001); see also Kemp et al., supra note 4, at 17.
9
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 5, at 4-299.
10
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RECOVERY PLAN FOR MOBILE RIVER BASIN AQUATIC ECOSYSTEM 21–22 (2000).
11
Richter et al., supra note 7, at 1087–89; see also David Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats
to Imperiled Species in the United States, 48 BIOSCIENCE 607, 611–12 (1998).
12
See infra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
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agricultural and silvicultural lobbyists,13 have proven reluctant to exercise their regulatory authority. State reluctance continues in spite of
federal exhortations, incentives, and hand-holding in the form of technical and procedural guidance.14
In their control of NPS discharges in general, and agricultural NPS
discharges in particular, many states have commonly relied on voluntary
Best Management Practices (“BMPs”) backed by economic incentives for
compliance. In doing so they tacitly or explicitly have been exempting agricultural discharges from the otherwise applicable requirements of general state water quality statutes,15 and failing to apply CWA-mandated
Total Maximum Daily Load (“TMDL”) discharge limitations to nonpoint
sources, whose runoff adds to the pollution of already impaired waters.16
Even states with binding and comprehensive regulatory controls over
agricultural nonpoint discharges, such as California, have continued to
emphasize cooperative and voluntary means of implementation, scrupulously avoiding enforcement against agricultural dischargers.17 Across
13

See, e.g., Oliver Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V: Aftershock and Prelude,
32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10385, 10416 (2002) [hereinafter Houck 2002]; see also Oliver Houck,
The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I, TMDLs and the Chesapeake Bay, 41 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10208, 10208–210, 10213, 10215, 10218, 10219 (2011) [hereinafter Houck 2011]; see
also J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 263, 293, 308–09 (2000).
14
See, e.g., Robert Adler, Water Quality and Agriculture: Assessing Alternative Futures,
25 ENVIRONS ENVTL L. & POL’Y J. 77, 88 (2002); Scott Anderson, Watershed Management
and Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Massachusetts Approach, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
339, 358 (1999); David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory
Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515,
527–28 (1996); see also ENVTL. LAW INST., ENFORCEABLE STATE MECHANISMS FOR THE
CONTROL OF NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION 1, 6 (1997) [hereinafter ELI 1997];
ENVTL. LAW INST., ALMANAC OF ENFORCEABLE STATE LAWS TO CONTROL NONPOINT
SOURCE WATER POLLUTION 3 (1998) [hereinafter ELI 1998]; ENVTL. LAW INST., PUTTING THE
PIECES TOGETHER: STATE NONPOINT SOURCE ENFORCEABLE MECHANISMS IN CONTEXT i–ii
(2000) [hereinafter ELI 2000]; EPA OIG, supra note 1, at 5.
15
See ELI 1997, supra note 14, at 1; ELI 2000, supra note 14, at 1; see also ELPC, supra
note 1, at 3; MICHELLE PEREZ, ENVTL. WORKING GROUP, FACING FACTS IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY 1–3 (2009) [hereinafter EWG], available at http://static.ewg.org/reports/2009
/FacingFactsInTheChesapeakeBay.pdf.
16
See, e.g., CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WATER QUALITY:
IMPLEMENTING THE CLEAN WATER ACT 8–9 (2006); Adler, supra note 14, at 77; Houck
2002, supra note 13, at 10385; David Smith, Water Quality and Agriculture: How Can
TMDLs Help?, 25 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 93 (2000); see also Robert Adler, TMDLs,
Nonpoint Source Pollution and the Goals of the Clean Water Act, PROGRESSIVE REFORM
BLOG, http://www.progressivereform.org/perspTMDLs.cfm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
17
See ELPC, supra note 1, at 11.
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the board, states have also been slow to heed the EPA’s call to transition
from the inexact and hard-to-apply narrative water quality standards to
numeric nutrient standards, which create a solid basis for identifying
nutrient-impaired waters and controlling the dischargers responsible for
the pollution of these waters.18 The agricultural industry is vehemently
opposed to anything that begins to hint at the possibility for binding and
enforceable regulation, even something preliminary like setting numeric
nutrient standards that facilitate the identification of pollution and enable the allocation of pollution reduction responsibilities among the responsible dischargers.19
The practical results of the states’ preferred regulatory strategies
arguably speak for themselves: fifty-three percent of the most recently
assessed river and stream miles, 66.5% of assessed lake, pond, and reservoir acreage, and sixty-three percent of assessed estuarine areas are
impaired.20 An impaired body of water is defined as not in attainment of
state-developed water quality standards and so unable to support designated uses.21 Agricultural discharges are the leading cause of impairment in rivers and streams, and the third leading cause of impairment
in lakes and reservoirs.22 At least 14.5% of these impaired river and
stream miles and at least twenty-six percent of the impaired lake and
reservoir acreage are water-quality impaired by nutrients, with these
numbers potentially a major underestimate due to inconsistencies in the
18

See OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, STATE ADOPTION OF NUMERIC NUTRIENT STANDARDS (1998–
2008) 4–5 (2008); EPA 2006, supra note 1, at 2.
19
See, e.g., RICHARD BUDELL ET AL., FLA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., OFFICE OF
AGRIC. WATER POLICY, ECONOMIC IMPACTS AND COMPLIANCE COSTS OF PROPOSED EPA
NUMERIC NUTRIENT CRITERIA FOR FLORIDA AGRICULTURE 2 (2010); see also Steve Davies,
11th Circuit Upholds Florida Water Quality Settlement, ENDANGERED SPECIES & WETLANDS
REPORT, (Aug. 4, 2011, 11:16 PM), http://www.eswr.com/2011/08/11th-circuit-upholds-florida
-water-quality-settlement/. Another important factor is the resistance of NPDES-regulated
nutrient dischargers, such as industrial dischargers—municipally owned and publicly
owned treatment works. These point sources are justifiably concerned that if agricultural
dischargers continue to successfully evade discharge controls, they would once again have
to shoulder the burden of additional discharge reductions identified as necessary under
the new, more precise standards. See, e.g., Meline MacCurdy, EPA Proposal for Numeric
Nutrient Standards for Florida Waters Has National Implications, MARTEN LAW (Feb. 3,
2010), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20100203-numeric-nutrient-standards; see
also Houck 2002, supra note 13, at 10385.
20
National Summary of State Information, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://iaspub.epa.gov
/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control (last updated Apr. 10, 2013).
21
Glossary, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl
/glossary.cfm#I (last updated Mar. 6, 2012).
22
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 20.
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state reporting of impairment causes, which these aggregate statistics
are based on.23
Filling the existing regulatory gaps through a legislative strengthening of federal controls over NPS discharges, or even tightening regulatory controls within the existing jurisdictional bounds of the CWA, seems
unlikely. This is particularly so considering the ongoing resistance and
political clout of the regulated community and of agricultural interests
in particular.24 It also does not seem wise to hold one’s breath for a major
upsurge of new and appreciably more effective state regulatory interventions, given abiding state deference to the preferences and regulatory resistance of the regulated agricultural community.25
Various strategic attempts to improve controls on NPS discharges
by working inside the margins of the CWA have also been met with resistance from the regulated community. For example, the recent litigation
that succeeded in getting the Ninth Circuit to reclassify runoff from logging roads as a point source subject to the permitting and discharge limitations of the NPDES program26 has met with strong resistance from the
logging community and local government.27 As such, their present success
23
For example, some states report impairments related to nutrient enrichment under
other categories of impairment. One such category is impairment by “Organic Enrichment/
Low Dissolved Oxygen” which can, and sometimes does, include oxygen depletion from
“Nitrogenous BOD.” See Specific State Causes of Impairment that Make up the National
Organic Enrichment/Oxygen Depletion Cause of Impairment Group for Threatened and
Impaired Rivers and Streams Reporting Year 2008, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://ofmpub
.epa.gov/tmdl_waters10/attains_nation.cause_wbtype_detail?p_cycle=2008&p_cause
_group_name=ORGANIC%20ENRICHMENT/OXYGEN%20DEPLETION&p_wbtype
=STREAM/CREEK/RIVER&p_wtype_display=Rivers%20and%20Streams&p_sz_column
=%20size_1&p_sz_unit=miles (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
24
See, e.g., Justin A. Ritter, AFBF v. EPA: Synopsis of AFBF’s Summary Judgment Motion,
AGRICULTURAL LAW RESOURCE AND REFERENCE CENTER (Feb. 17, 2012), http://law.psu
.edu/_file/aglaw/Chesapeake_Bay/AFBF_v_EPA.pdf (describing the current AFBF lawsuit
challenging the EPA-issued regional TMDL for the Chesapeake—in spite of the fact that
the TMDL is just a standard that EPA has no power to implement). The EPA promulgated TMDL after years of failure of voluntary measures to reduce water quality degradation by discharges of nutrients and sediment (largely nonpoint). CLAUDIA COPELAND,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CLEAN WATER ACT AND POLLUTANT TOTAL MAXIMUM
DAILY LOADS (TMDLS) 1 (2012). These failures prompted environmental non-governmental
organizations (“ENGOs”) to sue the EPA to push it to implement the standard. See id.
25
See, e.g., ELPC, supra note 1, at 4; EWG, supra note 15, at 1; Houck 2002, supra note 13,
at 10387.
26
See Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011); cert granted Decker
v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 132 U.S. 865 (2012).
27
See Cassandra Profita, NW Congressional Leaders: Let Logging Roads Be, ECOTROPE
(July 14, 2011, 9:55 AM), http://www.opb.org/news/blog/ecotrope/nw-congressional-leaders
-let-logging-roads-be/.
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may prove only temporary. In other words, controlling NPS pollution and
NPS nutrient pollution is proving to be among the more pernicious policy
and regulatory challenges in contemporary environmental regulation.
This Article explores a new, conceptually different approach to
overcoming this challenge. Specifically, it outlines a legal strategy for
strengthening the controls and prevention of nonpoint nutrient pollution
through leveraging key provisions of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)
against individual NPS dischargers and/or their state regulators.
This strategy starts with the widespread ecological damage from
nonpoint nutrient pollution and seeks a regulatory silver lining to the
harmful effects of such pollution on federally listed species of aquatic
wildlife, given the strong protections that the ESA, especially Section 9,
provides for such species against the harmful effects of both private and
governmental actions. The strategy explored here, in short, seeks to achieve
a measure of improvement in the practical and/or regulatory control of
NPS discharges by using a point of leverage outside the limited regulatory reach of the CWA.
This line of analysis is in significant part motivated by insights from
a previous paper, which explored the potential of the ESA to protect listed
wildlife from the growing threat of atmospheric nitrogen deposition,28
which is another broad ecological threat that is poorly addressed by the
current regime for regulating air quality in the U.S.29
While broadly modeled on our previous paper, the current analysis
is not limited to examining the capacity of the ESA to protect a particular
species of federally listed wildlife from nutrient-related harm. Rather, it
develops the broad parameters of a strategy for using Section 9 of the
ESA to ratchet the regulatory controls of nonpoint nutrient discharges
from agriculture. It suggests that there are promising possibilities for
reducing agricultural nutrient pollution, as well as other types of nonpoint pollution, through leveraging the “harm” and “take” prohibitions
of the ESA against individual nonpoint dischargers and their state regulators. Such possibilities are waiting to be explored in actual practice.
This Article provides a roadmap for the strategic use of ESA
Section 9 to help not just listed wildlife affected by nutrient pollution,
28
Zdravka Tzankova et al., Can the ESA Address the Threats of Atmospheric Nitrogen
Deposition? Insights from the Case of the Bay Checkerspot Butterfly, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 434, 436 (2011).
29
An air quality regime anchored in the federal CAA, similar to the water quality regime
anchored in the CWA, features a cooperative federalism arrangement of federal-state
sharing of regulatory responsibilities.
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but the broader nutrient-afflicted aquatic ecosystems of which listed
wildlife is but one part. It leaves much of the detailed work of identifying
and fully developing specific Section 9 cases to the water quality and conservation environmental non-governmental organizations (“ENGOs”)
who are already working to advance the health of aquatic ecosystems.
Part I of this Article offers a brief introduction to the technical
side of aquatic nutrient pollution, with an emphasis on the ecological consequences of nutrient enrichment. Part II discusses the main policy and
regulatory factors responsible for the persistence of nonpoint nutrient pollution in U.S. waters. Part III provides a brief overview of the Endangered
Species Act. Part IV offers the critical core of this Article, outlining the
most promising uses of the Endangered Species Act as a lever in improving regulatory control of the nonpoint nutrient pollution plaguing many
of our aquatic ecosystems and environments, including some of the most
biologically unique and diverse ones.30 This section also discusses some
likely policy and regulatory consequences of such ESA leveraging, including changes in the broader regulatory calculus and attitudes of the thus
far resistant agricultural community (agricultural nonpoint dischargers),
and potential jolts to reluctant states towards regulatory action. Finally,
the Article ends with some concluding thoughts on the potential and
limits of the ESA-based strategy for improving the regulatory control of
nonpoint pollution.
I.

AQUATIC NUTRIENT POLLUTION: THE ECOLOGICAL PREDICAMENT

Aquatic nutrients—nitrogen, phosphorous, and their common
compounds, like nitrates, phosphates and ammonia—are, as their very
collective denomination clearly suggests, a necessary component to the
normal functioning of aquatic ecosystems.31 As a key food source for the
aquatic plants at the base of aquatic food webs, nitrogen and phosphorous are in fact an important pillar of aquatic ecosystems.32
Nutrient pollution can be largely described as too much of a good
thing. Its ecological consequences, however, are no less significant because nutrient-caused disruptions to aquatic ecosystems are measured
in relative and ecosystem-specific threshold terms, rather than absolute
and universal ones.
30

See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 10; Charles Lydeard & Richard L. Mayden,
A Diverse and Endangered Aquatic Ecosystem of the Southeast United States, 9
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 800, 803–04 (1995).
31
See USGS, supra note 1, at 21–40.
32
See id.
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There is “a great deal of variability in inherent nutrient levels and
nutrient responses throughout the country. . . . due to differences in
geology, climate and waterbody type.”33 However, fresh waters, particularly lakes and reservoirs, tend to be phosphorous-limited, while brackish
and estuarine waters are generally nitrogen-limited.34 Useful characterizations on the natural nutrient variability across U.S. ecoregions and
waterbody types can be found in EPA guidance documents developed to
assist and enable the states in developing numeric nutrient standards for
water quality.35 The EPA considers numeric standards a first and critical
step in restoring nutrient-impaired waters, protecting waters from becoming impaired, and generally accomplishing the goals of the CWA; and
the EPA has long, and often unsuccessfully, urged the states to adopt
these standards.36
Whatever their baseline levels, naturally occurring limitations in
the biologically available supply of nitrogen and phosphorous serve important regulatory functions in aquatic ecosystems. Yet these natural
limitations are currently exceeded for a large fraction of the nation’s fresh
and estuarine waters. This condition of nutrient pollution has persisted
for the past several decades,37 and is significantly driven by nonpoint nutrient discharges, particularly agricultural runoff of fertilizers and manure.38
A recent U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”) assessment of nutrients
in the nation’s streams and groundwater found nutrient concentrations
in streams routinely measuring two to ten times greater than appropriate for wildlife protection, with median concentrations of total nitrogen
and phosphorous in agricultural streams about six times greater than
background levels.39 More generally, USGS concludes that “increases in
33

OFFICE OF WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT
REGIONAL NUTRIENT CRITERIA iv (1998) [hereinafter EPA 1998], available at http://
water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/upload/2009_01_21_criteria_nutrient
_strategy_nutstra3.pdf.
34
See NCSU Water Quality Group, Algae, WATER SHEDSS, http://www.water.ncsu.edu
/watershedss/info/algae.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
35
See EPA OIG, supra note 1, at 6.
36
See EPA 1998, supra note 33, at iii; EPA OIG, supra note 1, at 2.
37
See USGS, supra note 1, at 1.
38
See ELPC, supra note 1, at 1–2; USGS, supra note 1, at 30. Other nonpoint sources such
as urban runoff, certain types of point sources, and most notably, publicly owned treatment works and sewage processing plants are also contributors to nutrient enrichment.
Their role as a source of nutrient pollution can be significant in certain places. Many of
these other types of sources, however, can be regulated as point sources under the CWA,
and thus they remain outside the scope of the present analysis.
39
USGS, supra note 1, at 5.
OF
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nutrient loadings from agricultural and, to a lesser extent, urban sources
have resulted in nutrient concentrations in many streams and parts of
aquifers that exceed standards for protection of human health and (or)
aquatic life, often by large margins.”40 The assessment also found little
change in nitrogen and phosphorous for the ten year period studied, 1993–
2003.41 Changes in nutrient concentrations, where they did occur, more
often trended upward rather than downward.42 Data from the EPA’s
biennial water quality reports to Congress further corroborates this trend
of steady, persistent nutrient pollution and indicates its extension into
the most recent decade.43 EPA data also testifies to the continued primacy of nonpoint sources and agricultural nonpoint sources as the causes
of such pollution.44
Or, as starkly summarized by a recent report compiled by the
Environmental Law and Policy Center and the Mississippi River Collaborative and aspirationally titled Cultivating Clean Water: State-Based
Regulation of Agricultural Runoff Pollution:
The negative effects of nitrogen and phosphorus pollution
on aquatic systems have been documented nationwide. In
December 2006, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) issued a report from its Wadeable
Streams Assessment, which concluded that 42% of the
nation’s streams are in poor biological condition and [only]
25% are in fair condition. Nitrogen and phosphorus were
identified as major stressors contributing to degraded biological conditions: 31% of studied streams had high levels
of phosphorus and 32% had high levels of nitrogen. Similarly 64% of assessed lakes were listed as impaired. Of
these impaired waters, about 20% were listed as impaired
because of nutrient pollution. However these figures are
necessarily an underestimate because many states have
a policy of not recognizing nutrient impairments.

40

Id. at 1.
Id.
42
Id.
43
National Summary of Impaired Waters and TMDL Information, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://iaspub.epa.gov/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control?p_report_type=T (last updated
Apr. 2, 2013).
44
See id.; see also ELPC, supra note 1, at 1–2.
41
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Although nitrogen and phosphorus pollution comes from
several sources, agriculture is by far the largest source.
Agricultural contributions of nitrogen and phosphorus to
the Gulf of Mexico are 71% and 80%, respectively. Livestock production nationwide generates over a billion tons
of manure each year, much of which ends up in our nation’s
water. For perspective, that is fifty times the amount of
human sewage treated annually in this country. Row crop
production occurs on over 313 million acres of land. Animal
manure and chemical fertilizers are applied to much of
this land, yet only a fraction of the nitrogen and phosphorus in those applications is actually used by plants. Excess
nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizer runs off the land, degrading water quality locally and far downstream.45
By disrupting historic natural limits to nutrient availability and
altering nutrient ratios, this anthropogenic nutrient enrichment triggers
a range of ecological effects, including profound changes in ecosystem
structure and function. Many of these effects start with eutrophication,
which is the increased accumulation of plant biomass in response to
increased nutrient inputs,46 as algae is often the first to respond to an
increase in nutrient inputs.47 The nutrient-triggered growth in algal biomass can, in turn, produce an array of secondary consequences for aquatic
ecosystems. In streams, for example, excessive plant growth can reduce
stream velocity.48 Lower stream velocity causes greater deposition of fine
sediments along the stream bottom, which reduces quality and availability
of streambed habitat, and causes reduction or loss of bottom-dwelling
organisms.49 In estuarine environments, nutrient-triggered accumulation
of plant or algal biomass can increase turbidity and decrease light availability, killing off submerged aquatic vegetation. Thus it eliminates the
structurally complex benthic habitat provided by such vegetation, a
habitat with critical ecological functions as a refuge, feeding, and nursery
area for fish and invertebrates.50
45

ELPC, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added); see also EPA 2006, supra note 1; EPA OIG,
supra note 1, at 1–2.
46
See Rabalais et al., supra note 3, at 237 (citing Nixon, Coastal Marine Eutrophication:
A Definition, Social Causes and Future Concerns, 41 OPHELIA 199, 199–200 (1995)).
47
USGS, supra note 1, at 127.
48
Id. at 124.
49
Id.
50
See Rabalais et al., supra note 3, at 235–37.
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Aquatic oxygen deficiencies, including severe forms of anoxia and
hypoxia, commonly result from the death and decomposition of accumulated algal biomass, and these are the consequences commonly associated
with aquatic nutrient enrichment in the nation’s waters.51
As illustrated by the case of the Everglade snail kite, a locally endangered bird-of-prey, the common sequence leading from nutrient enrichment to the generally damaging species and ecosystem consequences
of aquatic oxygen deficiency is not limited to aquatic species.52
II.

NONPOINT NUTRIENT POLLUTION:
THE REGULATORY PREDICAMENT

The EPA has been trying to tackle the nutrient pollution problem for at least fifteen years, since the issues of nutrient pollution and
especially agricultural nonpoint pollution were highlighted in the Clean
Water Action Plan commissioned by Al Gore and the Clinton White House
in 1998.53 These issues were then almost immediately addressed in a
National Strategy for the Development of Regional Nutrient Criteria, in
which the EPA described the approach it intended to follow “in developing
nutrient information and working with States and Tribes to adopt nutrient criteria as part of State water quality standards.”54 This approach
included EPA development of guidance documents on the nutrient concentration levels appropriate for particular water body types, different
geographic regions, and the various uses intended for a body of water, as
well as the expectation that the states will use the guidance in adjusting
their water quality standards to include numeric nutrient criteria appropriate for supporting the designated uses of each water body in their
jurisdictions.55 The 1998 national strategy, in other words, was the EPA’s
original attempt at encouraging and assisting the states to replace their
difficult to monitor and implement narrative water quality criteria with
clear, enforceable, and regionally appropriate numeric nutrient standards.
Yet nearly fifteen years later, the problem of nutrient pollution
persists,56 threatening to become what the EPA estimates to be “one of
the costliest, most difficult environmental problems we face in the 21st
51

See EPA OIG, supra note 1, at 1.
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 5, at 4-291, 4-303.
53
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN: RESTORING
AND PROTECTING AMERICA’S WATERS 4, 10 (1998) [hereinafter EPA & USDA].
54
EPA 1998, supra note 33, at iii.
55
Id. at iii–v.
56
See USGS, supra note 1, at 132.
52
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century.”57 Given the structure and operation of the U.S. regulatory
scheme for water pollution control, this situation, while clearly a disappointment, is not necessarily a surprise.
A.

Aquatic Nutrient Pollution: The Reach and Limits of Federal
Authority Under the CWA

The reach and regulatory authority of the CWA, the country’s
preeminent (and in many ways spectacularly successful) water quality
statute, are actually quite limited when it comes to controlling nonpoint
sources of nutrient pollution. The CWA is particularly limited with regard to agricultural nonpoint dischargers, who are the primary source of
the nitrogen and phosphorous degrading U.S. waters.58
The CWA makes it illegal to discharge any pollutants from a point
source into waters of the United States unless such a discharge is explicitly authorized through a NPDES permit, issued by the EPA or an EPAauthorized state.59 However, it puts no such restrictions on the release
of those same pollutants through runoff from nonpoint sources, such as
the numerous and geographically ubiquitous agricultural and silvicultural operations.60 In fact, the CWA explicitly exempts from its permitting requirements agricultural discharges that would otherwise fall under
its definition of a point source and thereby be subject to the discharge
restrictions of a NPDES permit.61 While discharges from Concentrated
Animal Feeding Operations (“CAFOs”) are generally required to comply
with the point source permitting requirements, the implementing regulations for such discharges leave enough loopholes to ensure that many
CAFOs can legally operate without a NPDES permit, despite being one
of the most significant contributors of nutrients and other pollutants to
U.S. waters.62
57

ELPC, supra note 1, at 1; STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GROUP, AN URGENT
CALL TO ACTION: REPORT OF THE STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GROUP 1 (2009)
[hereinafter STATE-EPA NITG].
58
STATE-EPA NITG, supra note 57, at 15, 17, 22.
59
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a)(1), 1342(b) (2006); see also Nat’l Assoc. of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 649–55 (2007) (focusing on the conditions for the
EPA’s delegation of Section 402 permitting authority to the states).
60
While the Act contains a definition for point sources, it contains no parallel definition
for nonpoint sources. It is simply anything that does not meet the definition of a point
source. What is Nonpoint Source Pollution?, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov
/polwaste/nps/whatis.cfm (last updated Aug. 27, 2012).
61
For example, irrigation return flows are exempted. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), 1362(14) (2006).
62
ELPC, supra note 1, at 2 (“Discharges from Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
(CAFOs) are covered by the NPDES permit program . . . . In practice, this means that
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The CWA’s stated purpose is restoring and maintaining the nation’s
waters.63 However, nonpoint sources, one of the two major categories of
dischargers and the most significant contributor to nutrient pollution,64
are effectively exempted from the NPDES discharge permitting program,
and so from the key CWA approach of controlling the discharge of pollutants, regardless of the ambient consequences.
Nonpoint control is essentially left to the states. The CWA effectively directs them to manage NPS discharges on the basis of their ambient
effects, in apparent disregard of the well-known problems with this type
of regulatory strategy.65 Further, most of the CWA provisions that deal
with NPS pollution do not actually mandate any regulatory action by the
states; rather, they aim to steer and incentivize the states’ control of NPS
discharges.66 For example, Section 319 uses federal grants to encourage
the states to step up their management/control of NPS pollution.67 The
only requirement is a procedural one for the preparation of state assessment reports,68 and state management programs.69 Section 208 is similarly
weak in its expectations for utterly procedural state actions, such as

manure from these facilities is applied to land, where stormwater runoff is exempt from
regulation. Consequently, the largest contributors of nitrogen and phosphorus are scarcely
regulated at the federal level and pollution problems continue to worsen.”).
63
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
64
ELPC, supra note 1, at 1–2.
65
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329 (2006). The CWA’s statutory predecessors’ strategy was
ambient-based controls. The CWA intended to replace this strategy through the introduction of the NPDES program, which was subsequently very successful, and its reliance on
technology-based, universally applied discharge controls. See, e.g., Oliver Houck, TMDLs,
Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based Regulation Under the
Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REV. 10391 (1997) [hereinafter Are We There Yet?]; Oliver
Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based Regulation Under
the Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REV. 10329, 10332 (1997); Oliver Houck, TMDLs III: A
New Framework for the Clean Water Act’s Ambient Standards Program, 28 ENVTL. L.
REV. 10415, 10416–20 (1998) [hereinafter Houck 1998].
66
See, e.g., Are We There Yet?, supra note 65, at 10391; Kelly Seaburg, Murky Waters:
Courts Should Hold That the “Any-Progress-Is-Sufficient-Progress” Approach to TMDL
Development under Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act Is Arbitrary and Capricious,
82 WASH. L. REV. 767, 769–70 (2007); Zaring, supra note 14, at 521, 523–24.
67
33 U.S.C. § 1329(h) (2006).
68
These reports identify waters that cannot meet state water quality standards without
further control of nonpoint sources, and also identify the nonpoint sources responsible for
such impairment of water quality. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (2006).
69
State management programs should point to appropriate Best Management Practices
for nonpoint control, identify programs that can help implement the BMPs, and provide
a schedule of annual implementation milestones. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b) (2006).
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development of “areawide waste treatment management plans,” in return
for federal money.70
Even where the CWA provides some mandates for state NPS control, such as in Section 303, the CWA’s provisions are insufficient to
ensure practical water quality results. Specifically, Section 303 of the
CWA requires states to develop and implement water quality standards
that specify the desired uses for each of a state’s water bodies, and stipulate the levels of water quality necessary to support these uses.71 These
standards serve as a broad parameter guiding states’ ambient-based
regulation of NPS discharges, and the EPA has the authority to review
and approve state standards.72 The EPA also has the authority to set
standards for states who fail to do an adequate job of following the relevant CWA mandates.73
For waters that cannot attain water quality standards due to excess of a particular pollutant or pollutants (also known as impaired waters,
303(d) waters, or water quality limited segments), states are required to
develop and implement TMDLs for the offending pollutants.74 States are
required to put impaired waters on a “pollution diet” by capping the total
amount of pollutants allowed to enter such waters, then tightening discharge restrictions on point and nonpoint sources to ensure that the combined total discharges of the offending pollutants do not exceed the TMDL.75
The very applicability of TMDL restrictions to nonpoint sources,
now well-established,76 has been strongly contested by the agricultural
and silvicultural industries.77 But as the TMDL experience to date indicates, applicability and application are two rather different things.
As with the development of state water quality standards, the
CWA provides some federal authority in the development of TMDLs for
impaired waters, whether they are impaired by point or nonpoint source
pollution.78 It calls on the EPA to step in and develop TMDLs for states
who have failed to come up with appropriate TMDLs, or failed to come

70

33 U.S.C. § 1288.
Id. §§ 1313(a)–(c)(2)(A); see also id. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 131.12–13 (2012).
72
33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a)(3)(B)–(C) (2006).
73
Id. § 1313(b).
74
If this offending pollutant has been identified by the EPA as one for which a TMDL
should be developed. Id. §§ 1313(d)–(e); 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(e) (2012).
75
See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002).
76
Id. at 1139.
77
See, e.g., Houck 2002, supra note 13, at 10386.
78
See Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1127–28, 1132, 1137.
71
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up with any TMDLs at all, although what constitutes a federally correctable state failure of 303(d) duties is still contested legal territory.79
However, when it comes to the actual implementation and enforcement of these TMDLs in waters afflicted by NPS pollution, the reach
of federal authority and the CWA is extremely limited.80 The authority
to control NPS discharges to impaired waters lies squarely and solely
with the states.81 However, the states, being keenly aware of agricultural
and silvicultural opposition to anything that even raises the possibility
of binding regulatory controls on their practices and discharges, have
proven reluctant regulators.82 Indeed, the state’s overall accomplishments in addressing nonpoint sources of water pollution and water
quality impairment have also been described as an “abject failure,”83 an
apparently fitting characterization considering that year after year,
nonpoint pollution and agricultural sources top the list of culprits for
water quality impairment.84
Whatever federal authority to intervene in TMDL implementation does exist comes through the CWA’s NPDES program.85 Given that

79

See Seaburg, supra note 66, at 791.
Dianne Conway gives a stark and still relevant characterization that “[t]he greatest
limitation on TMDL implementation is the fact that, under the Clean Water Act, the
Federal government has no authority to implement or enforce nonpoint source pollution
controls.” Diane Conway, TMDL Litigation: So Now What?, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 114
(1997). Therefore, “even if a TMDL is established which sets specific limits on a nonpoint
source of pollution, the EPA is powerless to enforce it and must rely on the state’s good
faith.” Id.; see also Robert Adler, CPR Perspective: Nonpoint Source Reform, CENTER FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, http://www.progressivereform.org/perspTMDLs.cfm (last visited
Apr. 2, 2013); Yee Huang, Here Come the TMDLs?, CPRBLOG (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www
.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=53EE7FB2-1E0B-E803-CA142D0C7D406F21.
81
See Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1140.
82
See infra notes 92–114 and accompanying text; see also Houck 2002, supra note 13,
at 10386.
83
Roger Flynn, New Life for Impaired Waters: Realizing the Goal to “Restore” the Nation’s
Waters Under the Clean Water Act, 10 WYO. L. REV. 35, 47 (2010) (quoting Eric E. Huber,
TMDLs: White Knight or Bureaucratic Nightmare, 4 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (2003)).
84
Nonpoint Source Pollution Control: Breaking the Regulatory Stalemate, ENVTL. DEFENSE,
http://www.envtn.org/uploads/GTLP-PNG.PDF (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
85
Some point source discharges are federally permitted. See OFFICE OF WASTEWATER
MANAGEMENT, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER PERMITTING 101 (n.d.), available at http://
www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/101pape.pdf. Whether a point source is permitted by the EPA
or a delegated state, the EPA has the authority to review its NPDES permit, and to refuse approval where the discharges allowed under a permit do not comply with the relevant TMDL. Id. For states refusing to comply with TMDL limits on point sources, EPA
can also revoke a state’s NPDES program. See id.
80
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program’s exclusive focus on point source discharges,86 such federal
authority—even if used to its fullest—is obviously limited in its practical
reach and capacity to advance water quality improvements and the
recovery of impaired waters. These limitations are vividly illustrated by
the past experience and ongoing struggles of the Chesapeake Bay against
nutrient and sediment pollution, much of which comes from agricultural
and other nonpoint discharges.87
Even the most recent extension of federal leverage over TMDL
implementation, which was conferred by the Ninth Circuit’s Friends of
Pinto Creek decision,88 still leaves the federal reach over NPS discharges
in impaired waters patently indirect. Further, it is contingent on the occurrence of specific practical circumstances (i.e., the need for new point
source discharges and so new NPDES permits in waters significantly impaired by nonpoint runoff), and its outcome is ultimately dependent on
a state’s choices and priorities in handling these circumstances.89 Most
86

See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Compliance Monitoring, ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/monitoring/programs/cwa/npdes.html (last
updated June 13, 2012).
87
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE NEXT GENERATION OF TOOLS AND ACTIONS TO RESTORE
WATER QUALITY IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY: A REVISED REPORT FULFILLING SECTION
202A OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13508 (2009); see also EWG, supra note 15, at 7; Houck 2011,
supra note 13, at 10213; Karl Blankenship, Congress, Farm Community Say EPA
Overreached with TMDL, BAY J. (Apr. 2011), http://www.bayjournal.com/article/congress
_farm_community_say_epa_overreached_with_tmdl; Karl Blankenship, Public, in Comments, Weighs Pros and Cons of TMDL for Bay, BAY J. (Dec. 2010) http://www.bayjournal
.com/article/public_in_comments_weighs_pros_and_cons_of_tmdl_for_bay; Tom Pelton,
“Voluntary, Collaborative” Bay Cleanup Is Failing. A Call for Stronger Action and
Regulation, BAY DAILY (June 2, 2010), http://cbf.typepad.com/bay_daily/2010/06/the-leaders
-of-chesapeakebay-region-governmentsare-holding-an-annual-meetingtomorrow-in
-baltimore-with-epa-officials-and-i.html; EPA, Agriculture Community Talk Bay Cleanup
Plan, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/14
/epa-agriculture-community-talk-bay-cleanup-plan/.
88
Friends of Pinto Creek v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 504 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2007), cert
denied 129 S.Ct. 896.
89
Friends of Pinto Creek addresses the conditions for permitting new point source
discharges of pollutants into waters already impaired by pollutants. The Ninth Circuit
reviewed a claim that the EPA had violated the CWA and applicable regulations (specifically, 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i)) by issuing a NPDES permit to a new discharger of copper into
a copper-impaired stream that already exceeded the amount of dissolved copper allowed under the Section 303(d) Water Quality Standard. Friends of Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1009.
The Ninth Circuit found that the EPA was indeed in violation, ruling that before a new
NPDES permit can be issued for a discharge into an impaired body of water, that body
of water must have an appropriate TMDL. Id. at 1015–16. The TMDL must have adequate load allocations and credible compliance schedules that guarantee the attainment
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important for the present discussion, the Friends of Pinto Creek ruling
states that “. . . EPA has the responsibility to regulate discharges from
point sources and the states have the responsibility to limit pollution
coming into the waters from nonpoint sources,”90 and stipulates that if
discharge restrictions and compliance schedules for point sources alone
are insufficient to ensure the attainment of water quality standards, “then
a [new NPDES] permit cannot be issued unless the state or [the discharge
permit applicant] agrees to establish a schedule to limit pollution from a
nonpoint source or sources sufficient to achieve water quality standards.”91
The Friends of Pinto Creek ruling means that in waters primarily
impaired by NPS discharges, the capacity to permit new point sources of
the impairing pollutants will be contingent on a state’s implementation
of NPS discharge controls. Licensing of a new point source would also
require compliance schedules that plausibly promise the attainment of
water quality standards. The Friends of Pinto Creek ruling thus opens up
a possibility that at least in some cases, states overseeing TMDLs for
impaired waters would have a compelling enough reason to implement
actual regulatory controls on NPS discharges to those waters, if locating
a new point source on these waters is an important enough priority.
In sum, the actual practical capacity to control NPS discharges of
pollutants, including nutrient pollutants, into U.S. waters lies outside
the scope of federal authority and the statutory reach of the CWA, and
in the statutory and regulatory hands of the states.
B.

What the States Are Doing—and Not Doing—to Regulate
Nonpoint Nutrient Discharges from Agriculture

States have proven reluctant regulators. This is particularly so
when it comes to imposing any binding controls and performance expectations on the powerful and vocal constituency of agricultural (nonpoint)
dischargers, a constituency well-used to virtual immunity from most environmental regulations.92 Even states with more comprehensive, binding

of water quality standards and ensure the capacity to accommodate new point source
discharges without causing or contributing to the violation of these standards. Id.
90
Id. at 1014.
91
Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
92
See Zaring, supra note 14, at 524 (noting that “[s]tates were unwilling to provoke powerful agricultural constituencies with strict regulation when the Federal Government did
not obligate them to do so”); see also ELPC, supra note 1, at 4 (discussing how state regulation and enforcement of nutrient discharge controls is significantly impeded by political
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controls on agricultural runoffs, such as California, are still experiencing
the same political pressures of the regulated community and holding
back on enforcement.93
With agriculture as the primary contributor of nutrient enrichment in U.S. waters, this combination of state-vested authority and state
regulatory reluctance is particularly consequential. To put it in the words
of the recent Environmental Law and Policy Center review of state-based
regulation of agricultural nonpoint pollution, “[n]onpoint source pollution
is the greatest threat to water quality in the United States, yet neither
states nor the federal government has [sic] taken adequate steps to defuse
that threat.”94
The federal failure can be largely characterized as a failure to legislate, best exemplified by the failure of the CWA to provide for sufficient
federal regulatory authority over nonpoint discharges and dischargers.95
The failure of the states is most often a failure to exercise available regulatory authorities to control nonpoint discharges, most notably those
from agriculture.96
If states are arranged along a regulatory continuum based on
their control of agricultural nonpoint discharges, few will fit at either
extreme.97 There are no states without any relevant authority for controlling agricultural nonpoint discharges,98 and with absolutely no provisions
for the control of such discharges; even the weakest regulators have some
voluntary BMPs and the authorities and guidance of CWA Sections 208
and 319.99
But neither are there states that truly fit at the “good” end of the
nonpoint regulatory continuum: states with agricultural runoff controls
that are binding and comprehensive, well-tailored to the specifics of regulated dischargers and discharges, properly implemented, and diligently
enforced, including compliance monitoring and credible consequences for
non-compliance.
A few states, like California, come close to the “good end” of the
nonpoint regulatory continuum, but still notably miss the mark. The rest
resistance to the idea of regulating agriculture); Houck 2002, supra note 13, at 10386;
Ruhl, supra note 13, at 267–68.
93
ELPC, supra note 1, at 9–11.
94
ELPC, supra note 1, at 3.
95
See supra notes 79–91 and accompanying text.
96
See Zaring, supra note 14, at 524; ELPC, supra note 1, at 4.
97
See ELI 1997, supra note 14, at i.
98
Id.
99
Id. at i–iv.
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are arrayed along the continuum in various clusters of regulatory deficiency, from the insufficiently comprehensive and insufficiently binding to
the truly spotty in coverage and optional in application. This is true even
when all available authorities for controlling nonpoint nutrient discharges
are accounted for, rather than just dedicated agriculture or nonpointspecific statutory and regulatory provisions.
California, for example, has binding, comprehensive, and enforceable regulatory controls on agricultural nonpoint discharges. Under the
Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act of 1969, the state water pollution control statute, “[a]ll discharges of waste into the waters of the State
are privileges, not rights.”100 Nonpoint sources are required to have permits issued by the Regional Water Quality Control Boards (“RWQCBs”)
designed to ensure attainment of regional and state water quality goals
set by the State Water Resources Control Board and RWQCBs.101 Compliance monitoring in California is limited, however, as “a significant
number of dischargers are not yet aware of their obligation to comply
with the California program,”102 and the RWQCBs focus their enforcement efforts on those agricultural nonpoint sources who are clearly
creating water quality problems.103
Another example of a state closer to the “good” than the “negligent/
deficient” end of the NPS regulatory continuum is Delaware. Delaware
has a set of reasonably comprehensive and binding agricultural NPS controls, which take the form of requirements for agricultural operations
above a certain size to develop and implement a nutrient management
plan.104 However, implementation and enforcement by the Delaware
Nutrient Management Commission are not exactly diligent and rigorous.
In 2008, for example, “the Commission received less than half of the annual reports required of each person with a nutrient management plan.”105
100

CAL. WATER CODE § 13263(g). California NPS dischargers are also required to develop
and implement NPS plans, which are individual or group plans designed to ensure the
permitted dischargers meet water quality objectives. See ELPC, supra note 1, at 12–15.
Regional Water Quality Control Boards are also responsible for reviewing and approving
the plans, and for carrying the authority to enforce compliance with the plans and permit
conditions. Id. at 15.
101
ELPC, supra note 1, at 12.
102
Id. at 13.
103
Id. at 14.
104
Such controls apply to operations with eight or more livestock, or ten or more acres of
nutrient-applied land. 3 DEL. CODE § 2247(a)); see also ELPC, supra note 1, at 17–18.
105
ELPC, supra note 1, at 17 (citing DEL. NUTRIENT MGMT. COMM’N, ANN. REP. 2008 3 (2009),
available at http://www.dda.delaware.gov/nutrients/forms/2008/NM_2008%20Annual
%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf).
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The Commission normally pursues three or four violations, tending to
resolve these informally, rather than applying the potentially substantial
penalties provided under the state’s nutrient management program.106
Some states, like North Carolina, mandate the use of particular
BMPs by agricultural operations adjacent to particular state waters.107
However, the practical pollution control value of these geographically
limited controls is further weakened by broad exemptions.108 Others, like
Georgia, impose seemingly broadly applicable NPS BMPs like stream
buffer requirements, but then explicitly exempt agriculture and forestry
from these requirements.109
And a number of states require setbacks for the land application
of waste and manure.110 Some state requirements are stricter in the formulation of their setback rules and more comprehensive when defining
the population of agricultural operations to which these rules apply.111
Arkansas’s requirements, for example, are stricter than Illinois’s.112
In many states—including states with no binding regulations over
NPS discharges—general water quality statutes still give the various
state agencies the authority to control polluting agricultural runoff.113
However, such authorities are seldom exercised.114
The upshot—no state-level regulations are controlling NPS
discharges in a way that is simultaneously comprehensive, binding,
enforceable, and enforced. Even states like California, who have reasonably comprehensive and binding regulations, choose not to enforce
such regulations.
C.

The Present Regulatory Predicament and the Way Ahead

So this is the dedicated regulatory regime we currently have for
controlling nonpoint origin aquatic nutrient pollution—a combination of
federal CWA authority that is indirect and severely limited,115 and an

106

ELPC, supra note 1, at 18.
Id. at 37.
108
Id. at 38.
109
See id. at 67 n.242.
110
Id. at 40–45.
111
ELPC, supra note 1, at 40–45.
112
Id.
113
ELI 1997, supra note 14, at i–ii.
114
Id. at ii; ELI 1998, supra note 14, at 3; ELI 2000, supra note 14, at 140.
115
See supra Part II.A.
107
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array of state regulatory programs that range from the reasonably comprehensive but poorly implemented and generally unenforced to the
genuinely patchy and deficient.116
Unsurprisingly, then, the recent State-EPA Nutrient Innovations
Task Group (“Task Group”) concluded that aquatic nutrient pollution is
a huge problem and likely getting worse.117 The Task Group emphasized
that things are not going to get any better unless NPS nutrient discharges are finally properly controlled.118 In fact, the Task Group warns
that without NPS controls, things are likely to get worse, since regulated
point sources are increasingly chafing at bearing a disproportionate
share of the pollution control burden.119
But how are the long-elusive improvements in nonpoint pollution
control to be finally achieved? The Task Group calls for “[f]ully using the
tools we have,” meaning the full deployment of existing statutory and regulatory authorities, as well as “[e]xploring new authorities that we need.”120
Yet, stronger new statutes—federal or state—are notoriously hard
to come by, and the history of state NPS regulation points to clear and
long-standing reluctance to really fully use the tools we have.121 Many
states may well want to do better in controlling nonpoint pollution, nutrient and otherwise, but not at the cost of angering or alienating agricultural constituencies, which are largely unwilling to entertain binding and
enforceable controls. More stringent state regulation would be a particularly hard sell if the negative effects of agricultural origin nutrient enrichment on prized recreational and commercial uses are mainly felt by
other states downstream.
At the same time, past experience clearly suggests that in a Venn
diagram of NPS regulatory controls, there is insufficient overlap between
the voluntary—as in the fairly ubiquitous voluntary BMPs for agriculture—
and the effective—as in regulatory requirements that consistently produce
practical water quality results.122 This is not because most agricultural operators are unwilling to abide by voluntary BMPs—to the contrary, many
operations across numerous states are implementing useful BMPs.123 It
116

See supra Part II.B.
STATE-EPA NITG, supra note 57, at 33–34.
118
Id. at 33.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 34.
121
See ELI 2000, supra note 14, at 140.
122
See STATE-EPA NITG, supra note 57, at 31; ELPC, supra note 1, at 2; EWG, supra
note 15, at 1–2; see also Adler, supra note 14.
123
See Adler, supra note 14, at 83–84.
117
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is because enough large operators with significant discharges are unwilling to do so, offsetting the pollution control and water quality gains made
by good-faith agricultural actors,124 and successful controls on NPS
pollution.125 Ultimately, when runoff management is done on a voluntary
basis, there is a limit to what operations who volunteer to protect water
quality can implement while staying within the margins of the affordable and cost-efficient—even with federal and state cost shares and
conservation grants.126
It seems overwhelmingly clear, then, that most states need an
extra incentive beyond the apparently insufficient sticks and carrots provided in the CWA to step up the control of NPS discharges. That is, most
states could use a nudge to at least fully use the tools they do have—
tools that, between the CWA TMDL program and existing state authorities over nonpoint discharges,127 would go a long way towards improving
on the current water quality and nutrient enrichment situation.
Incentives generated through the strategic leveraging of the ESA,
and especially the harm and take prohibitions of ESA Section 9 might
just fit the bill. Such strategic leveraging could help change the regulatory calculus of the agricultural community, making it more amenable
to the prospect of state regulatory controls that are even-handed in their
application and well-tailored in design.
I next turn to the details of such leveraging and its benefits for
addressing the regulatory and ecological predicament of nonpoint nutrient pollution. It is critical to note, however, that although this analysis
seeks to strategically use the presence of threatened and endangered species and the strong protections that ESA Section 9 provides for such
species as a way to improve on the persistent predicament of aquatic nutrient enrichment, it does not propose to turn the ESA into a direct instrument of water pollution control. Rather, it seeks to explore whether
the strong provisions and protections of the ESA can be deployed in ways
that would reduce the resistance of the agricultural community and other
NPS sources to binding and comprehensive state controls on NPS nutrient discharges, or jolt into regulatory action the state agencies with authority over NPS discharges.
124

See id.
See Are We There Yet?, supra note 65, at 10397–10401; Houck 1998, supra note 65, at
10435–38.
126
See, e.g., Mark B. David et al., Tile Drainage Directly Related to Nitrate Loss, SCI.
NEWSLINE (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.sciencenewsline.com/articles/2010092712000042.html.
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See generally ELI 1997, supra note 14; ELI 1998, supra note 14; ELI 2000, supra note 14.
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THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

The ambitious goal of the Endangered Species Act is to “provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved” and “to provide a program for the
conservation of such endangered species and threatened species.”128 The
triggering of the statute’s considerable conservation powers is contingent
upon the presence of a species in peril. The peril can come in the form
of overharvesting, habitat destruction, disease or predation, the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms, or other natural and manmade
factors.129 In order for an imperiled species to benefit from the statute’s
protections and trigger its conservation powers, it has to be listed as
threatened or endangered.130 The listing is done by the Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”) or the National Marine Fisheries Services (“NMFS”),
who have the responsibility for implementing the statute.131 The listing
criteria and definitions are specified in Section 4 of the ESA.132
Once a species has been listed as threatened or endangered, it
gets considerable protections under Sections 7 and 9 of the ESA. Section 7
requires each federal agency, in consultation with the FWS or NMFS, to
ensure that its actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of threatened or endangered species or adversely modify the designated critical
habitat of such species.133 While the Section 7 protections only apply in
cases where listed species threats are created through some sort of a
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16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006).
Id. § 1533.
130
An endangered species is defined in the ESA as
any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection under the
provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2006). A threatened species is defined as “any species which is likely
to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range. Id. § 1532(20).
131
The ESA names the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce as responsible for
implementing the statute. Id. § 1532(15) (2006). The Secretaries have delegated these implementation duties to the FWS and the NMFS, respectively. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE: ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT DECISION MAKING
1 n.1 (2008).
132
16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006).
133
Id. § 1536(a).
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federal agency action, whether direct or regulatory/permitting, they cover
all listed species alike—threatened and endangered, plant and wildlife.134
Section 9 prohibits the take of endangered species of fish and
wildlife,135 and FWS regulations have extended this take prohibition to
most threatened species.136 The take prohibition applies to the actions of
private individuals and businesses as well as those of government agencies and employees.137 It has potentially far-reaching practical consequences given the broad definition of prohibited take.138 The definition
encompasses the possibility of take through habitat modification, opening up the possibility for numerous actions, including many otherwise
ordinary land uses, to result in prohibited take.
Finally, the ESA provides for the possibility of some limited exemptions from the categorical take prohibition of Section 9. It authorizes
FWS and NMFS to issue an Incidental Take Statement (“ITS”) during a
Section 7 consultation with federal agencies.139 The ITS effectively permits
some limited and conditional take resulting from the actions of federal
agencies, or their permittees, where the Section 7 consultation was conducted apropos permitting action with potential effects on listed species.140

134

Id. § 1536(a). Section 7 also establishes affirmative duties for species protection, by asking federal agencies to “utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purpose of [the ESA]
by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species.”
135
Id. § 1538(a). It is critical for the purposes of the current analysis, however, to note
that the “take” prohibition of Section 9 does not generally apply to listed plants. The ESA
makes the taking of listed plants on private land unlawful only if it is already prohibited
under state species protection laws or regulations. See id. § 1538(a)(2)(B). Section 9 of the
ESA is intended to help enforce state plant protection laws, but does not itself provide
equivalent protection for plants. Plants are, on the other hand, treated the same as fish
and wildlife under Section 7 of the ESA. See id. § 1536.
136
50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (2011). The NMFS stipulates protections for threatened species
under its jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. See id. § 223.201–11 (2011). Both agencies’
authority to extend further protections to threatened species stems from Section 4 of the
ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006).
137
16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(b), 1538(a) (2006).
138
The statute defines a “take” of listed wildlife to mean harassing, harming, pursuing,
hunting, shooting, wounding, killing, trapping, capturing, or collecting such wildlife, and/or
attempting to engage in such conduct. Id. § 1532(19). The FWS regulations interpret the
term broadly, noting that “[h]arm in the definition of ‘take’ in the [Endangered Species] Act
means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such acts may include significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2011).
139
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006).
140
Id.
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The FWS or NMFS can issue an ITS as long as neither the take nor the
agency action causing the take will jeopardize the continued existence of
the affected species or adversely modify its critical habitat.141
Section 10, introduced as part of the 1982 ESA amendments, provides another pathway for obtaining a permit for the limited take of listed
wildlife in the course of otherwise lawful activities whose purpose is not
the take of listed species. It requires the preparation of a conservation
plan by the private and/or government actors whose activities are expected to produce such a take,142 with the issuing of a take permit conditional on plan approval by the FWS or NMFS, who each have a fair amount
of discretion to impose additional terms and conditions.143
IV.

THE ESA—A WAY OUT OF THE REGULATORY AND ECOLOGICAL
PREDICAMENT OF NONPOINT NUTRIENT POLLUTION?

Many of the imperiled aquatic species currently affected by nutrient pollution, including federally listed fish and wildlife, reached their
threatened or endangered status as a result of habitat degradation and
habitat loss, often driven by hydromodification.144 More recently, however, pollution—particularly agricultural nutrient pollution—has risen
to the top in the hierarchy of threats for imperiled aquatic species.145
The rest of this Article examines whether and how the Endangered
Species Act can protect such species from the threat of nonpoint nutrient
pollution. The ultimate goal of the analysis, however, is to see how the
141

Id.
See id. § 1539(a)(1). Incidental take permits are essentially issued in exchange for preparing and funding the implementation of a conservation plan for the species affected by
the proposed activity. Conservation plans must specify the likely species impact of the
proposed incidental taking, the alternatives to the proposed take and reasons why the
alternatives are not feasible, the steps that the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate the impacts resulting from his/her taking of listed wildlife, the funding that will be
made available to take such mitigation steps, and any other measures that the FWS considers necessary. Id. § 1539(a)(2).
143
For details on the implementation and implications of Section 10(a) incidental take
and habitat conservation planning provisions, see CRAIG W. THOMAS, BUREAUCRATIC
LANDSCAPES: INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND THE PRESERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY 196–
201 (2003); Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles
Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279 (1998); John F. Turner &
Jason C. Rylander, Conserving Endangered Species on Private Lands, 32 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 571, 577–84 (1997); see also JUDITH LAYZER, NATURAL EXPERIMENTS: ECOSYSTEMBASED MANAGEMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2008).
144
Richter et al., supra note 7, at 1082; Wilcove et al., supra note 11, at 608.
145
Richter et al., supra note 7, at 1082; Wilcove et al., supra note 11, at 614.
142

2013] THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF NONPOINT NUTRIENT POLLUTION 735
nutrient pollution shield that the ESA may provide for listed species can
be used to protect the wider basins and watersheds of which listed species are a part. The discussion below suggests that these questions can
be answered in a hopeful affirmative.
The available data shows some significant negative effects of aquatic nutrient pollution on listed species, and also points to a likely plethora
of unprocessed, poorly documented, and incompletely analyzed evidence
of further such effects. It suggests that with some additional scientific research and some legal diligence, it is possible to find a number of aquatic
species affected by nonpoint nutrient enrichment—specifically agricultural nonpoint enrichment—in ways that qualify as prohibited harm and
take in violation of ESA Section 9, and that call for equitable relief.
Finally, the current situation of nonpoint nutrient pollution is
such that any equitable relief obtained on behalf of listed species—relief
that should come in the form of improved controls of nonpoint nutrient
discharges—should often benefit aquatic ecosystems and environments
beyond the immediate physical habitat of the nutrient-afflicted listed
wildlife. That is, they will benefit water quality and aquatic environments
more broadly, especially since agricultural and other nonpoint nutrients
often travel a considerable distance. For example, nonpoint nutrient
pollution is found as far south as the Gulf of Mexico, where a dead zone
exists that is largely caused by nutrient runoff from row crop agriculture
in the corn belt states up the Mississippi watershed.146 Reductions made
at the source to stop harm to listed species further downstream should
benefit all parts of the aquatic ecosystem previously affected by the
upstream runoff.
For the ESA to shield listed species and their wider ecosystems
from nonpoint nutrient pollution, it is necessary to engage its provisions
in ways that can produce improvements in the control and management
of nonpoint nutrient runoff. The rest of this section outlines the key elements of such an engagement. The discussion begins with a brief analysis
of the possible relevance of Section 7 in the broader endeavor of using the
ESA as leverage for improving the control of nonpoint nutrient discharges.
The bulk of the analysis then seeks to determine how the limitations on harmful activities as set by Section 9 of the ESA can be best
brought to bear on the agricultural activities and practices that cause
aquatic nutrient pollution in the habitats of nutrient-sensitive listed
146

See EPA OIG, supra note 1, at 7; USGS, supra note 1, at 22; Mark B. David et al., Sources
of Nitrate Yields in the Mississippi River Basin, 39 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 1657, 1657 (2010).
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wildlife. It determines how these restrictions on harmful activities and
the remedies that the ESA makes available to address harm can be mobilized to protect not only aquatic listed species, but also, and very importantly, the broader nutrient-afflicted basins and watersheds of which
nutrient-afflicted listed wildlife is a part.
I begin by outlining key prerequisites for the successful triggering
of Section 9 protections. Specifically, I discuss the elements of showing
nutrient-caused harm and take of listed wildlife: what is necessary to demonstrate nutrient-caused harm sufficient to qualify as a violation of the
harm and take prohibitions of Section 9, and to trigger the available ESA
remedies for such harm. Then, I discuss the linking of such harm to nutrient enrichment from agricultural nonpoint sources of nutrient runoff.
Finally, I focus on the critical question of who can be held liable
for agricultural origin nutrient harm, and the available ESA remedies in
cases of such harm. I also focus on how the successful procurement of such
remedies through strategically planned Section 9 litigation can alter the
regulatory calculus of the regulated community and broader regulatory
landscape of nonpoint pollution control in the United States.
A.

Nonpoint Nutrient Pollution and the Jeopardy and Critical
Habitat Provisions of Section 7

The requirements of the ESA Section 7 apply specifically to the
actions, direct or regulatory/permitting, of federal agencies.147 As discussed, federal authority over nonpoint discharges, as it exists under the
CWA, is limited and indirect.148 Still, there is federal (EPA) authority to
oversee and approve or correct state water quality standards.149 Given that
state water quality standards form a critical foundation for the ambientbased control of nonpoint discharges envisioned by the CWA,150 Section 7
has a potentially valuable, if auxiliary role in the larger strategic project
of using the ESA to leverage stronger and more effective controls of nonpoint nutrient discharges.
Section 7 requires that
[e]ach federal agency shall, in consultation with and with
the assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior or Commerce],
147

See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2006).
See supra Part II.A.
149
See id.
150
See id.
148

2013] THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF NONPOINT NUTRIENT POLLUTION 737
insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out
by such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as
“agency action”) is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
[critical] habitat of such species . . . , unless such agency
has been granted an exception for such action [under 16
U.S.C. § 1536(h)].151
To jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species is to engage in an action that would be reasonably expected to directly or indirectly reduce the likelihood of a survival or recovery of a listed species in
the wild.152 An agency action is, in turn, considered destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat if it produces a “direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both the
survival and recovery of a listed species.”153
These Section 7 requirements apply only to discretionary agency
actions, or actions where the acting agency has the authority to modify
its action if modification were necessary to avoid jeopardy or critical
habitat effects on listed species.154 In the CWA context, EPA approval of
state NPDES permitting programs that otherwise fulfill applicable CWA
requirements has been recently declared by the Supreme Court to be a
nondiscretionary federal action outside the reach of Section 7 jeopardy
and consultation requirements.155
EPA review and approval of state water quality standards, on the
other hand, calls for Section 7 compliance and a consultation with the relevant service where listed aquatic species are present in the area affected
by such approval and the subsequent entry into force of the approved
standard. The EPA conducts formal consultations where listed species
are present in the waters covered by state standards under its review.156

151

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2011).
153
Id.
154
See id. § 402.03.
155
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 671–73 (2007).
156
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE AND NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE REGARDING ENHANCED COORDINATION UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT 11 (2001), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/op/pds/documents/02/301
/02-301-22.pdf.
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The usual product of such formal consultations is a FWS or NMFS Biological Opinion, which “states the opinion of the Service [FWS or NMFS]
as to whether or not the [proposed and reviewed] Federal action is likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.”157
Biological Opinions usually contain an ITS, which shields the
federal agency, as well as any beneficiaries of its review and permitting
activities such as state agencies responsible for setting water standards
in this case, from Section 9 liability.158 It does so in case the agency’s
otherwise lawful activities, direct or permitting, result in the limited and
incidental take of listed wildlife.159 These liability protections, however,
are contingent on the agency’s compliance with the terms and conditions
of the ITS, which may include reasonable and prudent measures to minimize the impact of incidental take on the affected threatened or endangered species of wildlife.160 They may also include the terms or conditions
the federal agency, or the applicant for a federal agency permit or approval, must follow to implement those measures.161
If a state’s water quality standards are approved by the EPA in
consultation with the FWS or NMFS, then incidental harm and take of
listed wildlife related to the standard itself, its content and substance,
should be covered by the ITS of the Biological Opinion. The state standardsetting agency should be free from worry about running afoul of Section 9,
assuming that the state’s standard setting agency applies the standard
modifications suggested by the EPA as a result of the consultation.
For the purposes of the present analysis, I largely set aside the
question of the adequacy of state water quality standards when it comes
to protecting listed aquatic species. That is, I leave out an in-depth discussion of how Section 7 requirements and the Section 7 process can best
157

50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2011). If the relevant Service makes a jeopardy or adverse modification finding, then it would usually propose reasonable and prudent alternatives that
enable completion of the proposed federal action, direct or regulatory/permitting, while
protecting the listed species or habitats affected by this action. See id. § 402.01(a).
158
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED
SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK 2–12 (1998) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] available at
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/esa_section7_handbook.pdf.
159
See Paul Weiland, District Court Allows Action for ESA Violations to Proceed Regarding
Naval Operations Off the Atlantic Coast, ENDANGERED SPECIES LAW & POLICY (Dec. 28,
2012), http://www.endangeredspecieslawandpolicy.com/2012/12/articles/court-decisions
/district-court-allows-action-for-esa-violations-to-proceed-regarding-naval-operations-off
-the-atlantic-coast/.
160
See id.
161
See HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 2–12.
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be harnessed in the service of listed species protection and broader water
quality improvement. Instead, I focus the analysis on the pressing water
quality problems stemming from the states’ shortfalls when it comes to
ensuring the attainment of existing water quality standards through the
implementation of proper discharge restrictions on both point and nonpoint sources. More specifically, I focus on the problem of widespread
non-attainment of such standards due to lack of adequate discharge
controls on nonpoint sources.
That being said, Section 7 requirements and the Section 7 process
could potentially provide the EPA with a useful extra tool for prodding
the states towards the adoption of the numeric nutrient standards that
the EPA has long urged the states to put in place. The EPA could use any
extra leverage it can get on this front. It is currently facing a potential
flurry of CWA lawsuits seeking to make the agency develop and adopt
numeric nutrient standards for the many states who are not doing so
themselves.162 Getting into such standard development will further overstretch the EPA by adding to its substantial workload, and exposing it
to a whole new realm of potentially protracted litigation, a prospect that
the EPA has just gotten a taste of with its promulgation of numeric nutrient standards for Florida.163
B.

Agricultural Nutrient Pollution as a Prohibited Take?

Nutrient pollution is causing problems for a number of species
around the country. Currently, nutrient-driven anoxic and hypoxic conditions, significantly traceable to nonpoint sources, are causing increased juvenile mortality and interfering with reproduction of the
endangered shortnose sturgeon.164 Vegetation changes in parts of
the Florida Everglades, appreciably driven by agricultural nutrient enrichment, are also causing growing foraging difficulties for the Everglade
snail kite.165 Its ability to find apple snail prey is impeded by low visibility in the thickening stands of introduced and native invasive plants.166
Nonpoint nutrient pollution, including pollution from agricultural and
silvicultural sources, is listed by the FWS as the critical contemporary
162

See MacCurdy, supra note 19.
See Florida Wildlife Fed’n v. S. Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1299–1300
(11th Cir. 2011); Florida Wildlife Fed’n v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp.2d 1138 (N.D. Fla. 2012).
164
See Campbell & Goodman, supra note 8, at 772.
165
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 5, at 4-294 to 4-295.
166
Id.
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threat to surviving populations of several freshwater snails in the Mobile
River Basin, a global hotspot for freshwater biodiversity.167 Research based
on surveys of wildlife professionals, indicates that a quarter of imperiled
aquatic species are negatively affected by altered nutrient inputs.168 Further research which quantifies threats to imperiled species in the United
States confirms these results.169
Threatened and endangered species are, in other words, undoubtedly suffering the various ecological consequences of aquatic nutrient
enrichment. Much of it is attributable to runoff from nonpoint sources—
especially agricultural nonpoint sources. But are the effects of nutrient
enrichment on listed wildlife sufficiently serious to qualify as prohibited
harm and take under Section 9 of the ESA?
Section 9 prohibits the taking of any endangered species of fish
and wildlife,170 regardless of whether they are found on public or private
lands. The FWS has also passed regulations that extend this prohibition,
and so the Section 9 protections, to threatened species.171 Importantly,
the take prohibition applies to the actions of private individuals and
businesses as well as those of government agencies and employees.172
Important to the present discussion, the “take” prohibition does not generally apply to listed plants.173
Given that plants are largely excluded from the critical protections offered by Section 9, the focus here is on the impacts of nutrient
pollution on listed wildlife, and the implications of such impacts for the
possibility of a broader regulatory leveraging of Section 9 provisions.
As to the nature and implications of these critical protections: the
statute defines prohibited take of listed wildlife to include harassing,
harming, pursuing, hunting, shooting, wounding, killing, trapping, capturing, or collecting such wildlife, or attempting to engage in any such
conduct.174 Regulations further define “harm,” the part of the “take”
prohibition most relevant to the present analysis, to mean “an act which
167

See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 10, at 68.
See Richter et al., supra note 7, at 1086.
169
Wilcove et al., supra note 11, at 611–12.
170
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2006).
171
50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (2011). The NMFS, on the other hand, stipulates protections for
the threatened species under its jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. See id. §§ 223.201–11
(2011). Both agencies’ authority to extend further protections to threatened species stems
from section 4(d) of the ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2006).
172
16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(13), 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006).
173
Id. § 1538(a)(2)(B).
174
Id. § 1532(19) (2006).
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actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act[s] may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife
by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”175
What we know seems to strongly suggest that nutrient enrichment, much of which is traceable to agricultural nutrient runoff,176 is indeed affecting the shortnose sturgeon and the snail kite in ways that can
be readily described as prohibited harm and take. But for many other
species of listed wildlife who are negatively affected by nonpoint nutrient
pollution, species like the freshwater snails of the Mobile River Basin,
the available data, or simply just the available documentation, in terms
of published peer-reviewed or gray literature data, may not be sufficient
to make a Section 9 case. Indeed, many of the same scientific and technical
sources which point to the negative effects of aquatic nutrient pollution
on listed species also reveal that, in many cases of imperiled aquatic fauna,
the published readily available data on the magnitude and specific consequences of different threats lacks in resolution, precision, or detail.177
Furthermore, when considering the increased judicial scrutiny of
harm and take allegations that has followed the Supreme Court’s Babbitt
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon ruling,178 even
the more ecologically clear-cut cases like those of the shortnose sturgeon
and snail kite—both of which meet an ecological standard for harm—may
require considerable effort and some legal ingenuity to meet the judicial
standard for harm in ways that would persuade a court to decide that a
take had occurred.
At the same time, what we do know about threats to aquatic biodiversity points to a number of likely cases for nonpoint origin nutrient
175

50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2010) (emphasis added). Also potentially relevant to the current analysis is the definition of “harassing,” but this analysis focuses on harm, as harm is the more
encompassing and more fitting statutory category for the types of species harm caused
by remote origin nutrient-pollution.
176
See Robert Diaz & Rutger Rosenberg, Spreading Dead Zones and Consequences for
Marine Ecosystems, 321 SCIENCE 926, 926 (2008).
177
Wilcove et al., supra note 11, at 608–09; Richter et al., supra note 7, at 1082–85. This
is different than the issue of biological versus legal standards for harm. That issue can be
significantly misaligned with the most restrictive legal interpretations of the harm-take
standard, as it calls for levels of proof and evidentiary detail that cannot be satisfied by
the levels of certainty and proof normally attainable in ecological research. See Tzankova
et al., supra note 28, at 448–49.
178
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995);
see Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species in the West, 72
U. COLO. L. REV. 361, 389–90 (2001).
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harm to listed aquatic and aquatic-dependent wildlife.179 However, before
they could be taken up, these cases would need more precise description
and quantification, and await more scientific and legal attention.180
ENGOs attempting the strategy suggested in this analysis and
filing harm and take cases on behalf of nutrient-afflicted threatened and
endangered wildlife will likely have to navigate the fraught legal terrain
of showing harm through habitat modification, a terrain that remains
quite contested even after the Sweet Home clarifications. The Sweet
Home decision dealt with a direct challenge to the idea that habitat modification can constitute a prohibited take, affirming this idea in a 6–3
decision.181 But the Sweet Home decision also goes further, to discuss the
parameters for distinguishing between the kinds of habitat modification
that qualify as harm to protected wildlife and those that do not.182
Recognizing the complexities of ecological causation, the Court left
the specifics of distinguishing between “simple” habitat modification and
harmful habitat modification to the lower courts,183 thus leaving ample
room for practical contestation in each new case.
So what is necessary for demonstrating that agricultural or other
nonpoint origin nutrient pollution is harming listed wildlife in ways that
qualify as prohibited take? What would it take to persuade post–Sweet
Home courts that nonpoint nutrient pollution is violating Section 9 of the
ESA in ways that merit equitable relief?
To survive legal contestation, a claim of agricultural origin nutrient harm should address the “three elements for harm,”184 and ideally,
address them in a way that comes as close as possible to meeting the
standards of evidence and proof set by conservative interpreters of the
Sweet Home decision.185 A case for agricultural-origin nutrient harm and
take of listed wildlife should, at its most thorough and challenge-proof,
aim to demonstrate that agricultural nutrient runoff is (1) the proximate
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See Wilcove et al., supra note 11, at 612.
See id.; see also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 10, at 14–16.
181
Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708.
182
See id. at 702–04.
183
Tzankova et al., supra note 28, at 453.
184
See, e.g., Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities
“Take” Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and the “Harm” Regulation?, in ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES 214–15 (Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert
Irvin eds., 2002).
185
For a detailed discussion on the different and unsettled standards for showing harm
through habitat modification, see Tzankova et al., supra note 28, at 451–52.
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cause of (2) the death or tangible actual injury (3) to an identifiable member of a listed wildlife (i.e., of a specific, individual animal).186
Under the conditions imposed by conservative interpreters of the
Sweet Home decision—those who aim to constrain the ESA’s capacity to
rectify the all-too-common problem of harm through the modification,
destruction, or degradation of the habitat of endangered and threatened
wildlife—a showing of harm would ideally involve dead or severely injured wildlife bodies, with a clearly visible knife sticking out of their
back.187 For instance, dead or visibly hurt individuals of a listed wildlife
species whose presence and condition can be directly and unproblematically linked to specific instances of nutrient discharges. In the case of nonpoint nutrient pollution, that could be something like ammonia discharges
made in the vicinity of listed aquatic wildlife, and rendering the watery
habitat of such wildlife directly and immediately toxic to such wildlife.188
Most nutrient enrichment effects on listed species are, of course,
far more complex and far less direct, but ultimately not less significant.
In the case of the Everglade snail kite, for example, the harm caused by
excess nutrients is occurring through nutrient-driven changes in the
plant communities of the kite’s foraging areas, and the reduction of prey
visibility and foraging effectiveness that results from such plant community changes. Specifically, harm is caused by the thicker plant stands
dominated by nutrient-responsive invasive plants—both exotic and native invasives.189 Not exactly a bloody knife, but a chain of causation that
clearly ends with the impairment of an essential behavioral pattern—
feeding. But is the feeding impairment borne of such nutrient-driven habitat degradation significant enough, and does it injure this endangered
bird sufficiently to qualify as prohibited take of snail kites? Is it the kind
of adversity that even more conservative interpreters would acknowledge
as fitting within the FWS definition of harm through habitat modification which “actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”190
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Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 184, at 214–15.
See, e.g., id. at 216.
188
For details on ammonia toxicity, see USGS, supra note 1, at 114 (discussing how nutrient forms such as the un-ionized form of ammonia can be toxic to aquatic plants, invertebrates and fish if above certain concentrations. Ammonia is a common component of
synthetic fertilizer and a normal product in the decomposition of manure wastes and
other nitrogen containing compounds).
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See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
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50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (emphasis added).
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Under the conservative standards, the harm experienced by the
kite would likely be seen as way too uncertain and ultimately insufficient. The mechanisms of harm would be seen as too indirect—the chain
of causation from nutrient runoff to any vegetation-change-related detriment experienced by the snail kite would be way too long and tenuous to
seriously consider this particular instance of nutrient-caused adversity
as harm and take in violation of Section 9 provisions of the ESA. Conservative interpreters specifically insist that a significant impairment of
essential behavioral patterns—which can often result from habitat modification or destruction that displaces protected wildlife from traditional
breeding, feeding, or sheltering grounds—cannot constitute wildlife injury in and of itself.191 They demand fairly direct links between habitataltering activities and species injury for a habitat-altering activity to be
scrutinized as a prohibited take.192
It is important to note that while it should be useful for ENGOs
applying the broader legal strategy proposed in this Article to use the
most conservative standards as a guidance in building a case for nonpoint origin nutrient harm and take in violation of Section 9, there is no
reason to expect that all, or even many, actual cases would be subjected
to such standards.
As some prominent conservation and ESA scholars have pointed
out, the Sweet Home opinion has prompted many courts to apply stricter
scrutiny in cases alleging take through habitat modification.193 However,
stricter scrutiny is far from the near-rejection of the very possibility of
harm through habitat modification that conservative standards effectively
imply.194 Some courts may yet show flexibility on the question of whether
a showing of harm to distinct individuals is necessary to demonstrate the
occurrence of harm and take in violation of Section 9 of the ESA.195
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See Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 184, at 237.
See id. at 237–38.
193
See Doremus, supra note 178, at 390 (“The Sweet Home opinion’s emphasis on the fact
that habitat modification does not constitute take unless it actually kills or injures a member of the listed species has had more impact. Although expert testimony concerning the
effects of an action on a listed species can still be sufficient to prove harm without the
product of an individual injured animal, courts may be looking a bit more skeptically at
such expert opinions.”).
194
See Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 184, at 216.
195
For a suggestion that there is room for such flexibility, even in a post-Sweet Home
legal landscape, see Sean C. Skaggs, Judicial Interpretation of Section 9 of the Endangered
Species Act Before and After Sweet Home: More of the Same, in ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: LAW, POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES 276 (Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002).
192
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As for the issue of proximate causation and foreseeability, it is
unlikely to prove nearly as big of a practical or legal hurdle as conservative readers of the Sweet Home opinion would have liked it to be. Indeed,
the Sweet Home majority itself finds in the legislative history of the ESA
the indication that Congress intended the meaning of “take” to be broad
enough “to cover indirect as well as purposeful actions.”196 Further, the
Eleventh Circuit, for one, has regarded the Supreme Court discussion of
these issues as dicta,197 and the discussion does not appear to have had
significant influence on subsequent cases.198
On the practical side, the chain of causation between nutrient
runoff from an individual farming operation and the nutrient-triggered
harm to listed wildlife somewhere downstream, in a possibly remote part
of the watershed is likely to be long, with algal blooms and resulting
hypoxia, or nutrient-driven changes in plant communities and the resulting damage to feeding or sheltering grounds all likely links in that chain.
The whole chain of causation is often triggered by arguably ordinary
farming activities, whose pursuit is frequently remote from the location
and consequences of the nutrient enrichment that ends up harming
listed species.
Yet after more than fifteen years of explicit and ample scientific
and regulatory discussions on the ecological effects and problems of aquatic nutrient enrichment,199 the harmful effects of nutrient enrichment—
even the more subtle or less direct ones—cannot be credibly argued as
unforeseeable. Coinciding with this data, the magnitude, severity, and
considerable geographic expanse of the consequences from nutrient discharges by crop and animal agriculture have been well known and extensively documented for quite some time.200 Overall, then, there should be
relatively little dispute as to the foreseeability of nonpoint nutrient harm
to listed species. However, there is always the opportunity for individual
196

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 704 (1995)
(emphasis added). O’Connor’s concurrence does not exclude indirect causation either; it
only excludes causal arguments which fall under the categories of the unforeseeable and
the bizarre. Id. at 713 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
197
Doremus, supra note 178, at 389–90.
198
See id.
199
See EPA & USDA, supra note 53, at i; EPA 1998, supra note 33, at 2–5; USGS, supra
note 1, at 1–2.
200
See EPA 1998, supra note 33, at 44; USGS, supra note 1, at 10; see also Diaz &
Rosenberg, supra note 176, at 926; Turner et al., Gulf of Mexico Hypoxia: Alternate States
and a Legacy, 42 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2323, 2323 (2008); supra note 11 and accompanying text; supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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agricultural operations or other nonpoint sources of nutrient runoff to
deny the foreseeability or significance of their individual discharges leading to the ultimate harm befalling listed wildlife.
The cumulative nature of nutrient-caused harm will be an issue
that ENGOs aiming to use and leverage ESA Section 9 to improve the
practical and regulatory controls of nonpoint nutrient discharges will
have to address. As discussed below, there are several approaches for
handling the cumulatively harmful consequences of individual discharges
that may be less ecologically significant when standing alone.201 Most critical in informing the present analysis is the Sweet Home guidance
offered by Justice O’Connor, who underscored the question of fairness
when it comes to imposing liability for remote consequences: “[p]roximate
causation depends to a great extent on considerations of the fairness of
imposing liability for remote consequences.”202
Tracing nutrient-caused harm to the agricultural nonpoint sources
of nutrient runoff would indeed be a task. Agricultural discharges causing
or contributing to the nutrient enrichment that harms listed species can
be distant from the location of the affected species, and can be one of several categories of sources responsible for the harmful enrichment of an
aquatic habitat.203 However, it is a task that can be reasonably accomplished with the use of water quality models. A recent First Circuit ruling
has significantly vindicated the use of models in addressing the problem
of aquatic nutrient pollution.204
201

See infra Part IV.C.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 771 (1995).
203
Houck 2002, supra note 13, at 10415 (“To paraphrase a campaign slogan: ‘It’s about
agriculture, stupid!’ The nonpoint source pollution that has swamped the nation’s waters
has many and diverse sources, but the lion’s share are agricultural: crops and animals.
More than 50% of water impairment nationally comes from agricultural runoff. In some
western states dominated by cattle, the number reaches 90%. More than 80% of the eutrophication of the Gulf of Mexico dead zone is attributable to farm loadings over 500 river
miles away.”). But see id. at 10393 (“Turning to the sources of pollution, state data identified less than 5% of impairment from point sources only and about 25% from a combination
of point and nonpoint sources. Nonpoint sources were the exclusive sources of pollution
for 50% of the listed waters, with the remaining waters polluted by combinations of nonpoint and ‘other’ sources. The leading source of impairment was agriculture at 24.6%,
with another 11.4% attributed to unspecified ‘nonpoint’ causes.”).
204
See Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
690 F.3d 9, 25–27 (1st Cir. 2012). However, the use of water quality models in assigning
responsibility for nutrient water quality impairments and allocating discharge-control
responsibilities for their reversal through discharge limitations is currently being challenged by the American Farm Bureau Federation on behalf of agricultural interests in
the context of the recently issued EPA Chesapeake TMDL. AFBF Lawsuit Challenges
202
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C.

Attributing Liability for Take Through Nitrogen Pollution: Who
Should Be Held Liable for Agricultural Origin Nutrient Harm
and Why

The ESA makes knowing violations of its harm and take prohibitions punishable by both civil and criminal penalties.205 Most importantly for the present analysis, it allows for citizen suits to enjoin Section 9
violations.206 The value of Section 9 litigation for protecting threatened
and endangered wildlife from nutrient-caused harm—as well as the capacity of such litigation to help the broader nutrient-afflicted ecosystems
and watersheds of which listed wildlife is a part—hinges on how liability
for nutrient-driven harm and take is attributed. It also depends on the
remedies that courts will impose to stop such harm.
Now, assuming a satisfactory showing of nonpoint, agricultural origin nutrient harm, who is to be held liable for such harm? And what are
the available remedies, and their broader implications for water quality?
An immediately logical option is to look to individual nonpoint
sources, such as individual agricultural operations, whose land use activities and practices are the sources of the nutrient runoff ultimately responsible for nutrient enrichment and its various harmful consequences,
such as harm to listed aquatic and aquatic-dependent wildlife. Indeed,
FWS and NMFS have already recognized a need for Section 9 enforcement against nonpoint sources, but have been reluctant to go ahead with
such enforcement.207 They have been partly discouraged by the anticipated difficulty of meeting the evidentiary burdens for harm and take in
a context of multiple diffuse contributors to the nonpoint pollution that
ultimately harms listed wildlife.208 As already discussed above, however,
the evidentiary tasks required for tracing nutrient-caused harm to runoff
from agricultural and other nonpoint dischargers, while not trivial, are
also far from insurmountable.209 Indeed, the very water quality models
EPA’s Chesapeake Pollution Rule, AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N, http://www.fb.org/index.php
?fuseaction=newsroom.newsfocus&year=2011&file=nr0110h.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
The scope and capacity for using water quality models in the types of ESA Section 9 litigation discussed above will partly depend on the outcomes of these cases.
205
16 U.S.C. §§ 1540(a)(1), 1540(b)(1) (2006).
206
Id. § 1540(g).
207
See Eric Biber, The Application of the Endangered Species Act to the Protection of
Freshwater Mussels: A Case Study, 32 ENVTL. L. 91, 152 (2002).
208
See id.
209
In cases where the harm to listed wildlife stems from nutrient enrichment that is the
cumulative result of nutrient runoff from many individual agricultural operations, responsibility for the end result can be traced to individual contributors through the use
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that are already used to determine the contributions of different dischargers and assign load limits as part of the TMDL process should
enable the tracing of nutrient-origin harm to its nonpoint sources.210
Compelling practical logic also exists for looking to the state regulators responsible for controlling nonpoint discharges, and singling them
out as the ones whose regulatory actions—or inactions—are the cause of
agricultural origin nutrient harm to listed wildlife. It is indeed the state
water, environmental, or pollution control agencies in charge of protecting
state water quality who are uniquely positioned to anticipate and manage the cumulative effects of possibly harmful individual discharges. Further, they can do so with consideration of the consequences that such
cumulative pollution may have on aquatic life, both federally listed and
otherwise. Such agencies have both the capacity and authority—and in
some cases a statutory mandate—to protect water quality from degradation such as that triggered by the nonpoint origin nutrient enrichment
that ends up harming some listed species.211 Yet states are choosing not
to exercise their available authorities, with the arguably predictable result of agricultural origin nutrient harm to listed wildlife.212

of water quality models. Different models of liability could be useful in deciding how to
apportion the harm and take burden to individual contributors to the larger harmful enrichment. See, e.g., Matthew Gerhart, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act:
The Difficulty Of Proving Causation, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 167, 189–94 (2009). Since the ultimate objective of ENGO harm and take litigation in cases of agricultural origin nutrient
harm is to get injunctive relief, the most important practical aspect of such litigation is
identifying the contributors to harmful enrichment. The ENGOs could then focus on obtaining injunctive relief that addresses the agricultural origin nutrient harm by specifying practices whose changes will reduce nutrient enrichment, and apportioning needed
reductions, rather than any precise apportioning of liability.
210
Point sources will also be contributing and they will share in the liability. However,
the analysis here is explicitly focused on using the ESA to trigger improved management
and control of nonpoint discharges, since the regulatory tools and remedies available for
such discharges under the federal-state water quality regime are more limited and have
proven ineffective and underused. Since nonpoint discharges have proven resistant to
control under the water quality regime, this analysis attempts to find a useful new point
of legal and regulatory leverage outside the water quality regime. New leverage could
help change the attitudes of nonpoint dischargers towards the idea of binding and enforceable state controls over agricultural discharges, and could also make dischargers more
amenable to such controls. Further, new leverage could prod responsible state agencies
to ratchet nonpoint discharge regulations, or do a better job of implementing and enforcing the regulations that are already in place, such as those in California or Delaware.
See supra notes 92–106 and accompanying text.
211
See ELI 1997, supra note 14, at 21–22, 32.
212
See ELI 2000, supra note 14, at 1.
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In addition to the compelling practical logic for holding state regulatory agencies accountable for nutrient-caused harm and take of listed
wildlife, there is important legal precedent that supports such an approach. While there are some constitutional limits on the use of citizen
suits to hold states accountable for their regulatory actions,213 the fundamental notion that government regulatory actions can cause the take of
protected wildlife has been explicitly affirmed by the holdings of three
circuit courts—the First, the Eighth, and the Eleventh, in Strahan v.
Coxe, Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency, and Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County,
Florida (Loggerhead I), respectively.214
Both Defenders and Strahan deal with affirmative regulatory acts
by government and a “but-for” pattern of causation. In other words, if it
wasn’t for the regulatory decision or permit issued by a federal or state
agency, the act that caused the take of the listed wildlife could not have
legally taken place—but-for the agency permit, the act causing the take
could not have legally taken place.215
In Loggerhead I, on the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly
contemplated and accepted the possibility that prohibited harm and take
to a listed species can occur by virtue of a state regulator’s failure to act
diligently enough in the exercise of available regulatory authority.216 The
Eleventh Circuit has specifically established the critical notion that
regulatory inactions or deficiencies in the exercise of available statutory
authorities and mandates can be legitimately targeted as the cause of
prohibited harm and take.217
The decision of whether to target individual NPS nutrient dischargers or their state agency regulators will depend on the circumstances of a particular case, including the alignment of several variables
of the regulatory context for discharge: whether state water quality,
pollution control, or environmental agencies have the necessary statutory
authorities to regulate agricultural practices and agricultural NPS discharges in ways that could limit nutrient runoff and contain/prevent
213

See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 166–70 (1st Cir. 1997).
See id. at 163; Defenders of Wildlife v. Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 882 F.2d 1294, 1301
(8th Cir. 1989); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., Fla. (Loggerhead I),
148 F.3d 1231, 1242 (11th Cir. 1998).
215
See Strahan, 127 F.3d at 163; Defenders of Wildlife, 882 F.2d at 1301.
216
Loggerhead I, 148 F.3d at 1242 (explaining that the Agency’s failure to include the
taking of sea turtles through beach lighting in the incidental take permit was dispositive
that the Agency did not intend to allow the taking).
217
Id.
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nutrient enrichment and nutrient-caused harm to listed species; whether
state agencies with the necessary statutory authority to control NPS
nutrient discharges are actually exercising this authority (and the extent
to which they are exercising available statutory authorities); and whether
regulated NPS dischargers are operating in compliance with applicable
state regulations and limitations on their nutrient discharges. The alignment of these variables determines the extent to which state water quality, water pollution control, or environmental agencies can be held liable
for the harm to listed wildlife from NPS origin nutrient pollution.
If there were absolutely no regulatory controls over agricultural
nutrient runoff or the practices contributing to such runoff, coupled with
no state regulatory authority over agricultural practices or nutrient discharges from agriculture, then the choice would be an easy one. The targets would be the individual operations whose discharges are the sources
of the nutrient enrichment.
However, the practical situation with regulatory control of agricultural nutrient enrichment seldom fits either of these scenarios. There
are usually some sources of state regulatory authority over agricultural
and other nonpoint nutrient discharges.218 While they are not direct sectorspecific regulations, but rather authorities found in the general provisions of state water quality statutes triggered when agricultural or other
nonpoint discharges cause the violation of state water quality standards,
they do exist.219 And for nutrient-impaired waters, there are the federal
CWA mandates for state TMDLs that are designed to bring such waters
back in line with water quality standards and objectives, and which should
be implemented through discharge restrictions on nonpoint as well as
point sources.220
Another situation where liability rests with individual NPS dischargers, or groups of agricultural operations whose discharges are collectively responsible for nutrient enrichment causing the harm and take
of listed wildlife, is when responsible state agencies have done everything that is within their power to regulate NPS nutrient dischargers
and enforce applicable discharge controls; however, agricultural sources
have persisted in operating in violation of state controls, and the nutrient
enrichment attributable to such non-compliance is the cause of harm to
listed wildlife. In such cases, NPS dischargers are not only liable for
218

See supra Part II.
See ELI 1997, supra note 14, at 9, 11–12; ELI 2000, supra note 14, at 3–4. See generally
ELI 1998, supra note 14.
220
See supra notes 79–91 and accompanying text.
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2013] THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF NONPOINT NUTRIENT POLLUTION 751
violations of relevant state water quality laws and regulations—but more
consequentially—for violation of ESA Section 9, while the essentially
diligent if unsuccessful state regulators should be exempt from any harm
and take liability.221
For example, the Eleventh Circuit has clearly charted the terrain
of harmfully deficient regulation, and affirmed the possibility of Section 9
liability for regulatory take of listed wildlife that results from a failure
to exercise available authorities whose full and proper exercise should
avoid harm and take.222 However, this same precedent does exempt from
Section 9 liability “[r]egulatory bodies that adopt, and attempt in good
faith to enforce, regulations to prevent take,”223 even if these regulatory
bodies are ultimately unable to achieve perfect compliance. This creates
a system where bona fide regulatory efforts still count, and are capable
of shielding regulatory agencies from Section 9 liability for the outcomes
of their regulatory actions. Yet few state agencies with authority to control agricultural nonpoint discharges come close to meeting this standard
of diligence.224
While state agency refusal to control nonpoint discharges—or, as
in the California and Delaware cases, refusal to enforce applicable regulatory controls225—seems different from the affirmative issuance of a fishing permit that the First Circuit found responsible for prohibited take
in Strahan,226 a decision not to regulate, or a refusal to heed a mandate
to regulate, is no less of a regulatory action than the decision to do so.
A discretionary abstention from regulatory action is no more immune
to a regulatory take challenge than a discretionary exercise of regulatory authority.227
In addition to abstaining from exercise of available regulatory authorities, another common pattern of state regulatory shortfall that can
be classified as harmfully deficient is a state’s choice of regulatory controls. Specifically, the widespread state agency reliance on voluntary

221

See Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., Fla. (Loggerhead II), 92 F.
Supp. 2d 1296, 1307 (M.D. Fla. 2000); see also Doremus, supra note 178, at 392–93.
222
See Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., Fla. (Loggerhead I), 148. F.3d
1231, 1242 (11th Cir. 1998).
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Doremus, supra note 178, at 393 (discussing the implications of the Loggerhead II
decision).
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See supra notes 92–114 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 92–106 and accompanying text.
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Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 158 (1st Cir. 1997).
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See Loggerhead I, 148. F.3d at 1242.
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BMPs for controlling agricultural nutrient discharges—reliance that persists even in the face of ample evidence and experience suggesting the
deficiency of such voluntary regulation in preventing harmful nutrient
enrichment and over-enrichment.228 This reliance is arguably a regulatory action, as much a conscious exercise of state regulatory authority as
the issuing of a permit for an act that then results in harm and take of
listed wildlife.229 Reliance on ineffective BMPs and the choice not to exercise available regulatory authorities that enable state agencies to impose more binding and enforceable requirements on agricultural nonpoint
sources clearly fall in the category of “harmfully inadequate” regulation.230
Another instance of potential regulatory take can be found where
nutrient-caused harm can be traced to the failure of responsible state
agencies to implement or enforce applicable regulations against agricultural nonpoint dischargers. More accurately, the regulatory take would
exist when a conscious choice is made not to implement and enforce such
requirements. The rampant state failure to implement TMDLs,231 and
specifically, the failure—or more accurately, refusal—to impose discharge
restrictions on agricultural nonpoint dischargers as part of such implementation232 falls under this category of regulatory take.
State environmental, water quality, or pollution control agencies
often have the authority to control agricultural or other nonpoint nutrient discharges, but driven by political considerations, they may choose
not to exercise such authority.233 When this occurs, these agencies can be
held liable for nutrient-caused harm and take resulting from their
regulatory choices.234
228

See ELPC, supra note 1, at 3; EWG, supra note 15, at 1–2; Adler, supra note 14, at 78–80.
The failure to regulate is comparable to Massachusetts’s issuing of fishing licenses
whose use resulted in the take of Northern Right Whales, at issue in Strahan. See Strahan,
127 F.3d at 158.
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See Loggerhead I, 148 F.3d at 1260 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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See Flynn, supra note 83, at 47.
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See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
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See Doremus, supra note 178, at 393. Doremus further underscores that regulatory
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foreseeably take listed species.” Further, in at least some locations, the FWS appears to
be suggesting that it might premise enforcement actions on that type of liability. For example, the FWS persuaded a water development agency in Texas “ ‘to condition user
access to a new water supply line on construction standards designed . . . to avoid harm to
an aquatic salamander species’ on the theory that the water line would spur local growth,
which could impair water quality through runoff, harming the species.” Id.
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D.

Targeting Individual Agricultural Operations or Their State
Regulators: Available Remedies and Broader Implications

The point of pursuing Section 9 litigation in cases of agricultural
origin nutrient harm to listed wildlife is obtaining some practical relief,
both for the species and broader aquatic ecosystems against the nutrient
pollution causing the harm. ENGOs working to hold individual agricultural operations, groups of such operations, or their state regulators
liable for nonpoint origin nutrient harm should be aiming for some form
of injunctive relief.
The primary questions then become: what are the practical remedies available that courts could be reasonably expected to impose in these
cases? What are the prospects that Section 9 litigation—whether targeted at specific agricultural dischargers or their state regulators—can
alleviate the condition of nutrient-afflicted wildlife? Would injunctive relief and other practical remedies resulting from such litigation help water
quality and ecological health in the broader nutrient-afflicted watersheds
of which listed species are a part?
Whether it is an individual agricultural operation, group operations, or their state regulators that are found liable for harm and take in
violation of Section 9, injunctive remedies can draw on a readily available set of BMPs designed to reduce agricultural nutrient pollution by
managing both nutrient inputs and nutrient runoff.235 The technical side
of remedying agricultural origin nutrient harm through successful deployment of Section 9 protections against the agricultural operations
whose practices are the trigger of such harm is reasonably straightforward, even if implementation of the necessary input and runoff controls
is itself far from trivial and potentially labor and resource intensive.
More interesting to consider, however, are the potential political
and policy consequences of ESA-based injunctions that result in the imposition of new conditions on the conduct of agricultural operations and
their discharges. How are affected agricultural landowners and users
likely to react to the potentially sudden and widespread judicial imposition of requirements and conditions on the conduct and discharges of
agricultural operations? How will the national industry associations like
the American Farm Bureau Federation, who have long represented their
interests—and defined such interests in opposition to any binding, enforceable regulation over agricultural practices and discharges236—react?
235

See, e.g., ELPC, supra note 1, at 35–40; David et al., supra note 146, at 1665–66.
See We are Farm Bureau, AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N, http://www.fb.org/index.php?action
=about.home (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
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Such judicial impositions could come directly against the dischargers or through injunctions against the state agency regulators of
agricultural practices and discharges.237 Regardless of the form, the past
several decades of experience with attempted environmental controls for
agriculture suggest that the affected agricultural operators and their
regional and national industry associations are not going to like it, and
are certain to fight it in court.238
But like it or not, successful judicial imposition of restrictions
on agricultural practices and discharges—for example, injunctions that
survive appeals—should appreciably change the regulatory context for
agriculture. This new regulatory context would present many industry
members across different states with an altered set of regulatory choices.
Instead of practical near-immunity from discharge controls versus some
level of regulation and enforcement on the pollutant content of runoff
and/or the practices producing such runoff,239 many in the agricultural
industry would be facing a different choice. The choice would be between
judicially imposed, potentially unevenly and unequally applied controls
on practices and discharges,240 or some different, new form of regulatory
control. Industry advocates may well get to negotiate new forms of control, but these should be stricter, more substantive controls, negotiated
under a new negotiating baseline created by judicially-imposed ESA
based remedies.
As more ENGOs seize citizen suit opportunities provided by the
presence of nutrient-afflicted listed species in waters impaired by agricultural origin nutrient pollution, more agricultural operators will find
themselves at the mercy of the ESA, with the possibility for judicially
237

See supra Part IV.C.
See AFBF Legal Advocacy, AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N, http://www.fb.org/index.php
?action=legal.home (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (explaining that the American Farm Bureau
Federation has been in the courts fighting numerous policy and regulatory developments
that raise the potential for such stricter controls on agricultural practice). Because the
American Farm Bureau Federation proudly advertises its legal advocacy, it is reasonable
to expect that it will notice and respond to an actual case of binding controls, arrived at
through a type of litigation with a potential for widespread ENGO use. For recent docket
listing, see Recent Docket Table of Contents, AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N, http://www.fb.org
/index.php?action=legal.recentDocketTOC (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). For a list of their
cases on behalf of agriculture throughout their history, see Case Archive Table of Contents,
AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N, http://www.fb.org/index.php?action=legal.caseArchiveTOC (last
visited Apr. 2, 2013).
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See supra Part II.
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litigation.
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imposed or judicially driven requirements and restrictions on their operations. Depending on the scale of Section 9 litigation—and the magnitude of its practical effects on agricultural producers—many such producers
may find some form of predictable, uniformly applied yet appropriately
tailored regulatory controls preferable to the relatively unpredictable
risks of harm and take challenges.
If the ESA’s close to forty-year history has shown one thing fairly
conclusively, it is that hardly anyone, private and governmental actors
alike, is comfortable with the specter of ESA liability.241 Bargaining over
regulation can go much more smoothly and with much better conservation outcomes when it takes place in the shadow of this powerful conservation law.242
Finally, in considering the broader practical implications of leveraging ESA Section 9 against the dischargers and regulators responsible
for agricultural nutrient pollution, it is important to mention several
limitations on citizen challenges against state agency actions. These limitations may shape some of the practical outcomes of the proposed ESA
strategy, but should not change the core strategic benefits of leveraging
ESA Section 9 in the name of improving water quality and reducing agricultural nonpoint pollution.
At first blush, the effects of a successful harm and take challenge
against state agencies with regulatory authority over agricultural practices and discharges could be an even bigger boon to listed species and
water quality than the success of a Section 9 challenge against an individual agricultural discharger or a group of such dischargers. This is
because an injunction against a state agency in a case of agricultural
origin nutrient harm to listed wildlife could potentially produce broader
statewide or watershed-wide improvements in the control of agricultural
pollution. There are, however, some Constitutional limits on the types of
injunctive relief available to federal courts when the defendant is a state
agency.243 There are also some Eleventh Amendment limitations on the
capacity of ENGOs to sue state agencies that merit a brief discussion.244
Increasingly expansive judicial interpretations of the Eleventh
Amendment protections for state sovereign immunity are closing the
241
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opportunities for citizen suits against the states or their agencies.245 The
implications of such limitations for the legal strategy proposed here are
ultimately insignificant, however, as the rule created in Ex parte Young246
allows for suits against state officers—in our case, suits that name agency
officials, rather than the agency—as long as such suits are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.247 Injunctive or declaratory relief are precisely the types of relief desired in harm and take cases against the state
regulators of agricultural nonpoint discharges.
Potentially more significant for the deployment of the ESA-based
legal and policy strategy outlined in this article are the Tenth Amendment248 limitations on the types of injunctive relief that a federal court
can offer for an ESA violation committed by a state agency. Specifically,
these limitations mean that even if a state agency is found liable for a
Section 9 violation by virtue of its regulatory actions—or its regulatory
negligence—a federal court can issue an injunction but not specifically
tell the agency how to regulate.249 Still, a federal court can direct responsible state agencies to “find a means of bringing [their water quality regulatory] scheme into compliance with federal law [Section 9 of the ESA].”250
The courts can, in other words, order a stop to an agency’s regulatory behavior that is harmfully insufficient. Since the past several decades of research and regulatory experience have drawn reasonably clear
distinctions between successful and unsuccessful technical and regulatory approaches to the control of agricultural nonpoint pollution,251 the
inability of the federal judiciary to call for specific regulatory moves by the
states should not significantly detract from the potential of Section 9
litigation to launch a new chapter of improved regulatory controls for
agricultural nonpoint pollution.252
245
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CONCLUSION
In sum, the strategic path of using the ESA as a legal lever for
bringing some much needed improvement in the control of agricultural
nonpoint pollution will be neither direct nor easy. There is much factual
and legal work to be done by the ENGOs who take on such a strategy.
Yet, as this Article has tried to argue, the potential payoff from
such a strategy—in terms of pollution control and water quality, as well
as improved protections for listed species—is more than worth the effort.
Fifteen years after the control of agricultural nonpoint pollution and the
closely related problem of aquatic nutrient enrichment was made a priority item on the national environmental agenda253—fifteen years of regulatory starts and stops and copious CWA litigation—our waters are not
better off. The time is ripe for trying a conceptually different approach
to improving control of agricultural nonpoint pollution, and for addressing the related and severe problem of nutrient enrichment.
Hopefully, we can indeed find a regulatory silver lining to the predicament of imperiled aquatic fauna, who, alongside other species and
entire aquatic ecosystems, are struggling under the burden of nonpoint
discharges and nutrient pollution.

of either regulating in this area according to federal ESA standards or
having its regulations preempted by the federal ESA provisions and
regulations. Because, for preliminary injunction purposes, the [state of
Massachusetts’s] regulation of this area is inconsistent with federal
ESA standards, this situation falls squarely within the permissible balance of federal and state authority recognized by the New York Court
and the [state’s] regulations are preempted by the federal ESA provisions.
We believe that the district court acted within the scope of its equitable powers. The ESA governs the relief available in a citizen suit and
authorizes citizen suits to enjoin acts in violation of the ESA. . . . The
ESA does not limit the injunctive power available in a citizen suit, and,
thus, we understand the Act to grant a district court the full scope of its
traditional equitable injunctive powers. ‘Equitable injunction includes
the power to provide complete relief in light of the statutory purpose.’
Strahan, 127 F.3d at 170 (internal citations omitted).
253
See EPA & USDA, supra note 53, at i, 58.

